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AN

EXAMINATION

OF THE

Commercial Principles

OF THE LATE

NEGOTIATION, &c.

In MDCCLXI.

[Price One Shilling and Six-pence.]

ERRATA.

Page. Line.

4. 4. *for* ſpeak *read* ſpeaks.
11. 1. *for* negotionable *read* negotiable.
22. 11. *for* aad *read* and.
24. 27. *for* Ideas *read* Idea.
31. 1. *for* fa read far.
48. 13. *for* by Treaty *read* by the late Treaty.
50. 24. *for* Profit of *read* Profit upon.
60. note *laſt line, dele* to.
66. note 1 line *for* Leward *read* Windward.
105. laſt line *dele* alſo.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE Commercial Principles OF THE LATE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE In MDCCLXI.

IN WHICH

The Syſtem of that Negotiation with Regard to our COLONIES and COMMERCE is conſidered.

The SECOND EDITION.

Aguntur certiſſima Populi Romani vectigalia et maxima, quibus amiſſis et pacis ornamenta et ſubſidia belli requiretis— Nam ceterarum provinciarum vectigalia, Quirites, tanta ſunt, ut iis ad ipſas provincias tutandas vix contenti eſſe poſſimus.

CIC. *pro leg. Man.*

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MDCCLXII.

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AN

EXAMINATION

OF THE

Commercial Principles

OF THE

NEGOTIATION, &c,

THERE is nothing either in the general Plan, or in the particular Proviſions of the late Negotiation, which can be ſuppoſed, in the leaſt Degree, binding in any future Treaty. This is ſufficiently evident, not only from the expreſs Agreement of the two Courts, but, even if there had been no ſuch Agreement, from the very Nature of ſuch imperfect Tranſactions. A Retroſpect, however, to that Negotiation, may be attended with conſiderable Advantages. It may point out the Principles which then actuated our Adminiſtration, and may enable us to determine how far it will be conſiſtent with our Intereſt, on a ſimilar Occaſion, to adopt or to reject that Syſtem of Pacification.

21766

It is in my Opinion a fortunate Circumſtance, notwithſtanding the additional Expence which we have incurred ſince the Cloſe of the late Negotiation, that we have ſtill an Opportunity coolly and at Leiſure to review, and, if it be not preſumptuous, to rejudge the whole of that very intereſting Tranſaction: becauſe we are ſtill in a Condition to make ſuch a Reviſion of real Service to us. An Opportunity ſo favourable rarely occurs. Negotiations ordinarily remain involved in the prudential Obſcurity, with which Deliberations of that Importance ought always to be attended, until they are finally ratified. The Buſineſs of political Criticiſm is then at an End. However juſt it may be, it is then certainly uſeleſs.

We are not, I hope, ſo far gone in Military Madneſs, as to look no farther than the War. We do not fight and conquer without ſome Conſideration of the End and Purpoſe of our Victories, and our Acquiſitions. Whilſt the War continues our Object is ſimple; it is only by every poſſible Means to weaken and diſtreſs the Enemy. The Buſineſs of Pacification is more difficult, as it is more important. We are then to form ſuch Plans, and to purſue ſuch Meaſures, as may be moſt conducive to the laſting, ſolid, and ſubſtantial Benefit of our Country. This is a Matter which requires the moſt mature Deliberation; and therefore not only juſtifies, but demands the Intervention of every Perſon, according to the Sort of Knowledge

Knowledge he happens to poſſeſs; and calls for the publick Attention to every Propoſal which ſeems to ariſe from any Appearance of publick Spirit, and to be ſupported by any tolerable Degree of Information.

We are ſtill in the Train of Conqueſt; our Poſition and the Aſpect of Things are continually varying; but notwithſtanding theſe Variations, the general Plan of our Policy muſt be the ſame. Every Country has an Intereſt more particularly its own, reſulting from thoſe Circumſtances, which conſtitute its peculiar Strength and Safety. The great Source of our particular Opulence and Power, has hitherto been conſidered to ariſe from Trade; and it would be an unfortunate Effect of all our Bravery and Policy, if we had either fought or negotiated ourſelves out of our commercial Character. Advantages of a merely political Kind, will be always more or leſs problematical; their exact Value can hardly ever come to be eſtimated; and the political Syſtem is itſelf ſubject to ſuch Fluctuation, that what at one Time we may have ſought with infinite Eagerneſs, and bought at an enormous Expence, by a Change, owing perhaps to the Death or Depoſition of a foreign Prince, to a Love Intrigue, to perſonal Reſentment, or poſſibly to mere Inconſtancy and Caprice in thoſe who govern, may be rendered in a Moment inſignificant or uſeleſs, and even ſometimes dangerous. How was all *Europe* agitated,

almoſt within our own Memory, upon the Buſineſs of a Barrier for the *Dutch?* What Volumes were wrote upon that Subject, which no body now ſo much as ſpeak of? *Holland* thought her very Being depended upon it; *Great Britain*, with her uſual Warmth for all her Allies, was ſtill more earneſt than the Principal, and laboured this Work as the only Means of preſerving the Liberties and Independence of *Europe*; *France* omitted nothing in her Power to prevent, to obſtruct, or to fruſtrate the Deſign; and after all this mighty Buſtle, it would at this time be hard to ſay, whether *Holland*, *Great Britain*, or *France*, concern themſelves leaſt about that Barrier, which once ſo intirely engroſſed the whole Attention of them all. In reality, in every political Queſtion the Paſſions are always more or leſs engaged, our Deciſions upon ſuch Queſtions are of Conſequence leſs to be relied upon; let the Situation of Affairs change but a little, and our Ideas change with them.

But there is no Situation in which Wealth is not Strength, and in which Commerce is not Wealth. If Commerce is our Object, we *know*, and in all other Caſes we can at beſt only gueſs, what we acquire. From the general Nature therefore of ſuch Advantages, as well as from their Relation to our own more particular Intereſt, theſe ſhould be Objects capital, and Conditions indiſpenſable in every Scheme we form, every Conqueſt we propoſe, and every Negotiation we engage in.

In

In the Reign of Queen *Anne*, the Whigs and Tories mutually and juſtly cenſured each other, for that the one in the Treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, amidſt all the exorbitant Demands, and the other at the Treaty of *Utrech*, amidſt all their ſhameful Conceſſions, took very little Care to provide any commercial Advantages for their Country, * while the one laboured to protract the War, and the other to precipitate the Peace, ſolely for the Purpoſes of Party.

At preſent it would be indeed lamentable, if merely by miſtaking our Intereſt, when we cannot be miſled by Party, we ſhould fall into the ſame or a greater Error.

It

* " *Your Commons naturally inclined to hope, that they* " *ſhould find Care had been taken of ſecuring ſome particular* " *Advantages to* Britain *on the Terms of a future Peace, ſuch* " *as might afford a Proſpect of making the Nation amends in* " *time for their immenſe Treaſure which hath been expended,* " *and thoſe heavy Debts which have been contracted in the* " *Courſe of ſo long and burthenſome a War. This reaſonable* " *Expectation could no way have been better anſwered than by* " *ſome Proviſion made for the future Security, and the greater* " *Improvement of the Commerce of* Great Britain." Repreſentation of the Commons, Journals An. 1711, p. 122.

" *On this Repreſentation they vote the Perſons concerned in* " *making the Treaties there referred to, Enemies to their Coun-* " *try.*

" *That he ſacrificed the Commerce of* Great Britain *to* " France, *and particularly conſented to their fiſhing at* New- " foundland. Art. 13. *Impeachment of Lord* Oxford." Without entering into the Juſtice of this Charge, both Parties by their mutual Accuſations have ſufficiently ſhewn in what Light they conſidered this grand Object.

It is an Attempt full of Danger to project a Change in those fundamental Maxims of Policy, by which a Nation has been long sustained, and by which she has grown into Power. It has been remarked, that States have often suffered terrible Falls, or at least a very great and sensible Decline, which might be dated from the Moment of their Arrival at some very considerable Degree of Prosperity. This Fact, which furnishes to Declaimers no more than an Observation of the Fickleness of Fortune, and the Instability of human Affairs, may supply the political Reasoner with Matter of very useful Reflection. It is only in Time of great Prosperity, that States are intirely Masters of their own Conduct, and in a Capacity of executing new Schemes of Policy. An Error in those Schemes becomes at that Time highly dangerous; because they have then Ability to push their Error as far as it will go; and the Mischief they bring upon themselves, is proportionable to the Strength which they abuse. An erroneous Policy always precedes a declining Power. The Moment of Prosperity is therefore critical, and ought to be watched with the utmost Diligence, and used with the greatest Circumspection.

I think this Consideration, which on another Occasion might be too general, is at this Time next to necessary. I have lately observed that, in several political Writings, which did not want Admirers, a System has been laid down, which if no contrary to our national Interest, is

at

at leaſt contrary to all our former Ideas of it; and what is more material, that Syſtem ſeems to have been admitted as the governing Principle in the late Negotiation. I ſhall therefore think the Time not loſt, which is ſpent in examining this new Plan with Attention; and if I ſhould be thought to dwell long upon it, or to grow too minute, the Reader will be pleaſed to remember, that his Fatigue, whatever it may be, is much leſs than mine; and, that we are all deeply concerned in the Event.

In this Enquiry, I ſhall confine myſelf to thoſe Matters of which I have been able to furniſh myſelf with exact Details. Without theſe, all Reaſoning concerning commercial Queſtions, how well ſoever intended or conducted, will neceſſarily be lax and inconcluſive. Supported by theſe, it is of very little publick Concern what may be the Character, the Views, or even the Abilities of a political Writer. An intelligent and diſpaſſionate Reader, when he is furniſhed with the proper Facts, may form a a Syſtem for himſelf. By his Temper and his Sagacity, he may counteract the Paſſions, and ſupply the Deficiencies of his Author; and whilſt he is enabled to correct his Miſtakes, he will ſometimes deduce from his Facts a Chain of Conſequences, which may poſſibly have eſcaped the Writer, who originally furniſhed him with the Materials of Speculation. It is therefore of no Importance, to enquire what Prejudices may be entertained by the Publick, or by

any

any private Perſon, againſt, or in Favour of, any of the Objects of this Negotiation. The preſent Enquiry is not concerning Prejudices or Opinions, but concerning Matters of Fact only; and on the Evidence of theſe, I propoſe therefore to examine

I. What the Syſtem of that Negotiation was with Regard to our Commerce and our Colonies in *America*.

II. To examine into the Strength or Weakneſs of the Principles upon which that Syſtem was founded.

III. To touch upon the Motives which may have induced us at that Time to adopt ſuch Principles.

I chuſe to acquaint my Reader with the Method I intend to purſue, becauſe being far from any Intention of the ſmalleſt Deceit, or Surprize on his Underſtanding, this Order will better enable him to watch and to detect me, if I ſhould advance any thing falſe in Fact or inconcluſive in Argument.

The late Negotiation, ſo far as it regarded our Colonies and Commerce, was on our Side conducted, I apprehend, on one ſingle Idea, *viz.* to ſecure to ourſelves the Poſſeſſion of all *Canada*. I ſay, upon this ſingle Idea, becauſe from a careful Examination of the ſeveral Plans delivered to the *French* Miniſter it appears, that even an Attempt was not made, to procure in *America* any other Poſſeſſion, or any other Advantage whatſoever. Our Intereſt, and

and our Conquests in the *West-Indies*, were very little, if at all, regarded. On the Opening of the Treaty, we agreed to * negotiate away *Guadaloupe* and *Marigalante*; and in the Turns which that Treaty took, and in all the different Schemes of Commutation, which were from Time to Time proposed, and they were many and various, I do not find that it was for a Moment the Idea to retain that Acquisition we had made in the *West-Indies*, which the very Article that restores it to *France*, denominates a fertile || and wealthy Island; and which the very great Increase of our Trade since its Reduction, demonstrates not to have been at all over-rated in those Epithets, however it might be undervalued in the Exchange by which it was to have been surrendered.

The Reader will not entertain any Doubt that the Treaty was conducted on a Principle wholly averse to *West-Indian* Acquisition, when he recollects this very remarkable Fact.

Early in the Negotiation, and as I may say at the Out-set, we agreed to exchange † *Guadaloupe* for *Minorca*; but during the Progress of that Transaction *Belleisle* fell into our Hands.

* Hist. Mem. of the Neg. N° 21. Art. 8. "*His Majesty likewise agrees to surrender to the most Christian King "the opulent Island of* Guadaloupe, *with that of* Marigalante."

|| Hist. Mem. of the Neg. N° 27. Art. 6.

† N° 17. Art. 3, 4. N° 20. Art. 8.

Here was presented a new Subject for Exchange: It was quite natural to barter one *European* Island for another; and it became the more natural, as the one was of no great Advantage to *England*, nor the other to *France*; and both were heavily expensive to their respective Possessors. Accordingly, we find that ‡ Exchange was proposed; but what is very singular, even at the Time of making that Proposal, it does not appear that any Advantage was taken from this Circumstance, to retain the least Particle of our *West-Indian* Conquests. The original Scheme of Compensation was changed; *Belleisle* was offered (so the *French* understood it, and they never were contradicted) for *Minorca*; but *Guadaloupe*, the old Equivalent, was, notwithstanding this new Project, to have been surrendered; though not in Exchange for *Minorca*, nor for any thing else that I can discover; and therefore, without any distinct Compensation at all. Yet here also a Difficulty occurs; for it is not very easy to discover for what Reason *Belleisle* was taken, if it was not to be admitted among the Equivalents. The Expedition for the Reduction of this Island was undertaken after the Commencement of the Negotiation; and the Place could scarcely be desired for any other Purpose, than to give us some Advantage in that Negotiation; and yet a very few Days after we had taken

‡ Page 66., Art. 6 and 7. of Hist. Mem. of the Neg.

taken *Belleiſle*, its negotionable Value was eſtimated at nothing; and in all Appearance we ſuffered it to be added to *Guadaloupe*, in Compenſation for an Object which had been before offered us for *Guadaloupe* alone.

To ſtate this Dealing in a few Words; we firſt offered them *Belleiſle*, together with *Guadaloupe*; and at laſt we gave them *Guadaloupe*, together with *Belleiſle*. There was no Variation at all in the Compenſations by the Difference, or the Agreement of either of the Parties to the Negotiation, with regard to this Article. This will appear clearly to the Reader, if he compares the early Overtures of the *French* Miniſter with the ſubſequent Memorials. For what Reaſon I cannot judge, we ſeemed to think theſe two Objects of equal Value; and in different Ways at different Times we offered each of them *gratis* to the *French*.

Thus we were not ſatisfied with ſimply preferring *Minorca* to *Guadaloupe*, but we rejected *Guadaloupe* abſolutely, and without any viſible Advantage whatever; a Preference and a Rejection, which could by no Poſſibility have ariſen from any other Source than the Maxim which appears to have then governed our Councils; *viz.* that the *Weſt-Indies* were a Part of the World in which we ought to aſpire at nothing.

The Stamp of this Maxim is impreſſed on every Part of the Treaty; without having Recourſe to this Principle it is extremely difficult

to account for ſome Parts of our Conduct, which muſt otherwiſe appear altogether irregular and unſyſtematical.

The Fate of *Senegal* and *Goree* became a principal Matter of Diſpute in this Negotiation. With Regard to theſe, we were to the laſt Degree tenacious of our Acquiſition. The *French* would have been content with one of theſe Objects; they agreed to cede the Iſle of *Goree*, without which *Senegal* would always have been at our Mercy *. At length however they agreed to give up both *Senegal* and *Goree*; but in order to render this Ceſſion which we had ſo much at Heart palatable to *France*, we conſented to give them in return ſome *Douceurs* in the Slave Trade. It does not appear very clearly from the Memorial what they were; *Acra* and *Anamabo* were mentioned by the *French*; and they were not in Appearance refuſed on the Part of *England*. Whatever was the real Equivalent, this, however, is plain, that we thought *Senegal* and *Goree* very worthy of ſome Conceſſions, and of a great deal of Negotiation.

Now without recurring to the Maxim I have juſt mentioned, what colourable Reaſon can poſſibly be aſſigned for our Conduct? We were not ſo fond of *Senegal* and *Goree* becauſe they were a Security to our Colonies in *North America*. We did not ſeek them, to give us a

* Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg. 15 *July*. *Nov.* 17. Art. 7.

a Superiority in the *Mediterranean*. It muſt be merely as commercial Objects that we valued them. We could poſſibly have no other Motive. But were they, in a commercial View, Objects as conſiderable as *Guadaloupe?* No one ever imagined it. I ſhall ſhew preſently that the Trade of *Guadaloupe* is above ſeventeen times more conſiderable. What then could have been put into the Scale of *Senegal* to turn the Ballance in its Favour againſt this immenſe Diſproportion: except the Reſolution, however it came to prevail, that we ought not to extend our Trade, or our Empire in the *Weſt-Indies?*

It is neceſſary the Reader ſhould be warned, that the Queſtion then was not, nor now is, which ſhould have the Preference in our Eſtimation, *Guadaloupe* or *Canada*, the *Weſt-Indian*, or the *North American* Commerce; that Queſtion was practically decided by the voluntary unſollicited Ceſſion of the whole Country of *Canada*, * by *France* herſelf.

Had it indeed been neceſſary, by the Surrender of the fertile Iſland of *Guadaloupe*, to purchaſe the vaſt but unprofitable Foreſts of *Canada*, the Paſſion at leaſt of boundleſs Empire would have been flattered. There had perhaps

* Page 32 of Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg. "*Before a Memorial of Propoſitions was ſent in Form to the Court of* London, *his Majeſty's Miniſter entruſted to confer with Mr.* Stanley, *authoriſed him to write word, that* France *would guaranty the Poſſeſſion of* Canada *to* England."

perhaps been ſomething magnificent in ſuch a Deluſion. But from the Beginning there was no mention of an Exchange of that Nature. The firſt Overtures to the Treaty declare, that, not *Guadaloupe*, but the Privilege of the Fiſhery at *Newfoundland*, was the Compenſation for *Canada*; and through the whole Negotiation, no particular Conſideration is ſpecified as the Compenſation of *Guadaloupe* on our Side, but ſingly the Reſtitution of *Minorca* on theirs †.

When we had ſatisfied our Views in *North America*, our whole Buſineſs in *America* ſeemed to be conſidered as over. We hurried to *Europe*, and to *Africa*; our Thoughts being wholly alienated from the *Weſt-Indian* Commerce.

It will perhaps be objected againſt the Univerſality of the Aſſertion, that by Article the § 5th of the *French* Memorial of the 15th of *July* 1761; as alſo in ours of ‖ 29th of the ſame Month, a Diviſion of the four Iſlands called Neutral, was provided; and therefore we did not ſo intirely reject all Ideas of Acquiſition in the *Weſt-Indies*. The Fact I readily admit; but

† Page 27 of the Fr. Hiſt. Mem. "*The Liberty of* "*fiſhing, and the Shelter without Fortifications, was the Com-*"*penſation for the Ceſſion of all* Canada." The "*Reſtitu-*"*tion of the Iſland of* Minorca, *was certainly equivalent to the* "*Ceſſion of* Guadaloupe *and* Marigalante."

§ Vide Page 23. of the Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg.

‖ N° 21. Art. 5. Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg.

but I am very far from admitting alſo the Inference; for I apprehend, the Diſcuſſion of this Fact will add new Strength to my Aſſertion, inſtead of being in any Degree derogatory to the Point which I intend to eſtabliſh.

For I affirm, in this Partition of the neutral Iſlands, ſuppoſing the intended Partition to have been fair and equal in Point of Value (which I ſhall hereafter prove was by no Means the Caſe) inſtead of acquiring any thing by our Superiority in the War, inſtead of increaſing our Claims in Conſequence of our Victories, we actually receded from thoſe Claims, on which we had always inſiſted, previous to thoſe Conqueſts, and previous even to the War itſelf. In all our Memorials * on this Subject, we contended for the abſolute excluſive Right to the neutral Iſlands, and in Conſequence of this Right, ſo early I think as 1722, we attempted a Settlemet in the only one which is valuable amongſt them, *St. Lucie*; and though we tamely ſuffered this Settlement to be deſtroyed, we ſtill kept our Pretenſions alive with all the Vigour of which Negotiation is capable. And what is very remarkable, our Right is no where more clearly aſſerted than in that very Article, in which we agreed to give away theſe Iſlands. †

But

* Vid. Memorials of the *Engliſh* and *French* Commiſſaries concerning St. *Lucie*. *London*, 1755. Quatto.

† Vid. Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg. p. 37, 38. Art. 5. of the Anſwer of the *Britiſh* Court to the Memorial of *French* Propoſitions.

But allowing the Pretenſions of *England* and *France* to thoſe Iſlands had been equal in the Ballance, yet the Diviſion even then, and allowing it to have been an equal Diviſion, has given us juſt nothing. The Equality of the Right has produced an equal Partition of the conteſted Object; and each of the Litigants has taken a Part, in Compenſation of his Pretenſions to the Whole: On this footing we have only ended a Diſpute, we cannot pretend to ſay we have made an Acquiſition.

But if, as we have always underſtood, and uniformly aſſerted, our excluſive Right to thoſe Iſlands was clear, and indiſputable; then we are not only no Gainers, but we are even conſiderable Loſers by the Stipulation contained in this Article; and our immenſe Expences, and brilliant Advantages in the *Weſt-Indies*, have only afforded us an Opportunity of giving up our new Acquiſitions; and along with them a conſiderable Part of our old patrimonial Rights. Either it was unjuſt to have laid claim to the neutral Iſlands, if that Claim was not well founded; or, if we had the Right we pretended to the Whole, it did not appear quite reaſonable, after a victorious War, to accept of a Part only.

In *North America* we aimed to acquire a great deal more than we originally pretended to. In the *Weſt-Indies* we gave up a conſiderable Part even of our oldeſt and moſt valid Claims.

Claims. It is therefore evident, that our Conduct with regard to the neutral Iſlands, inſtead of being an Objection to my Obſervations on this Treaty, furniſhes a new and irrefragable Proof in ſupport of them; and indeed demonſtrates, that inſtead of aiming to extend, we thought it rather our Intereſt to contract our Dominions in the *Weſt-Indies*; and this naturally conducts us to the ſecond Point which I propoſe to examine:

Whether the general Syſtem, which I have ſhewn to have prevailed in that Negotiation, was founded on Reaſon, and the real reciprocal Intereſt of *Great Britain* and her Colonies; and whether the particular Objects we were to have received in Compenſation, were equivalent to the Ceſſions by which they were to have been purchaſed.

I will even puſh this Enquiry further, and endeavour to find out from an Inveſtigation of deciſive Facts, whether the whole Aggregate of all the Advantages of every ſort which we were to have obtained by every other Article of the Treaty, were not infinitely counterballanced by what we left in that ſingle Article, by which we were to have ſurrendered *Guadaloupe*. Theſe are, I am ſure, very intereſting Diſquiſitions, and very worthy the moſt ſerious Attention.

And firſt, with regard to the general Maxim of rejecting or greatly undervaluing a *Weſt-Indian* Acquiſition, I hope I ſhall make it appear to the Satisfaction of every unprejudiced

Reader, that it was grounded on a Want of due Attention to the Importance of the *Weſt-Indian* Colonies, in our Syſtem of Commerce; and that it could never have prevailed, if we had made the leaſt Enquiry into the Advantages which the *Weſt-Indian* Trade poſſeſſes, either ſolely, or in a Degree very ſuperior to any other. To ſay the Truth, I cannot help feeling ſome Surprize, that ſuch Ignorance, with ſuch Means of Information, could poſſibly become at all common in a commercial Nation; or that we ſhould ourſelves miſtake, or ſuffer others to miſlead us ſo exceſſively with regard to the relative Value of our *North American* and *Weſt-Indian* Poſſeſſions.

The fundamental Principle on which all Ideas of *Weſt-Indian* Acquiſition have been rejected, is a Maxim, laid down by the Writer of the Letter to two great Men, *That we had already Sugar Land enough*. There is no Word whatſoever of greater Latitude in the Conſtruction, when it is referred to private Concerns, than this Word *enough*. With regard to the Publick, it is often contracted within very reaſonable Limits. Does it here mean that we have Sugar Land ſufficient to ſupply the Home Conſumption? It is not ſtrictly true, that we have enough for the Conſumption of all the *Britiſh* Dominions. We know that in *Ireland* they uſe ſome, and in *North America* a very great Quantity of foreign Sugars, and Syrups; and we have Reaſon to believe that

ſome

ſome find their Way even into *England*. If he means that we have enough for foreign Conſumption, ſurely he is by this Time at leaſt informed, that before the War we had in a Manner wholly loſt the foreign Market for this Commodity. And unleſs he, or ſomebody for him, will be pleaſed to prove that the Sugar Commerce is detrimental, or not very advantageous to us, I conceive this Aſſertion will be altogether equivalent to a general Declaration, that we have foreign Trade enough. A Declaration, which however repugnant to Fact, and to the national Intereſt, is altogether conſiſtent with the Syſtem laid down in that Letter.

A further neceſſary Conſequence of this Maxim, of our having Sugar Land enough, is, that *France* has not too much of it. Indeed, if the *Weſt-Indian* is a loſing Trade, it is very agreeable to that Writer's Patriot Spirit, to wiſh the *French* as much of it as poſſible. However, though from very different Motives, he agrees perfectly with *France* herſelf in this Particular, She enjoys a conſiderable Territory in, and a moſt extenſive Trade with the *Weſt-Indies*, of which ſhe is far from wiſhing any even the leaſt Diminution. A little before the breaking out of this War, from the ſingle Port of *Bourdeaux* ſhe exported within thirty-two Months in *Weſt-Indian* Commodities

to the Amount of 2.768,628*l.* * I am not fond of advancing any thing, without the Support of authenticated Vouchers; but I am certain, I riſque very little in ſaying, that the Export from *Bourdeaux*, immenſe as it is, does not amount to more than one Half of the whole Export of *France* in *Weſt-Indian* Commodities; thoſe who are acquainted with the Trade of *Marſeilles*, *Nantes*, and the other principal Ports, will know that I ſpeak very moderately. The *Weſt-Indies* furniſhed to *France* therefore in the ſaid thirty-two Months an exported Produce worth 5.537,256*l.* or 2.076,471*l.* a Year, all which was purchaſed by her Manufactures; all which going to her Credit in the Account of her general Trade, was in ſome Reſpects equal to, and in others, ſuperior in Value to ſo much Treaſure.

By what Lights the Writer, whoſe dogmatic Aſſertion I am here conſidering, is directed in his Opinion concerning Commerce, I confeſs I know not; but for my Part, I have not even a Conception of any one Article of Trade more conſiderable in its Extent, nor more valuable in

* Account of *Weſt-Indian* Produce, exported from *Bourdeaux*, from *January* 1750, to *Auguſt* 1752.

Hhds of Brown Sugar.	White Ditto.	Indigo. lb.
35,219.	65,215.	1.624,208.

Coffee. lb.	Cacoo. lb.	Annatto.	Hides.
11.824,454.	224,405.	251,598.	7,169.

The original Vouchers from the Cuſtom-houſe of *Bourdeaux*, which authenticate the above Export, may be ſeen at Mr. *Dodſley*'s.

in its Nature, than this of *France* with her *Weſt-Indian* Colonies; nor any Object more fit to rouſe our Jealouſy, and (where the Acquiſition can be rendered lawful) more proper to excite our Deſires. *France* is indeed ſo truely ſenſible of its Value, and is ſo far from thinking ſhe enjoys too much of this Trade, that ſhe would ſooner yield a thouſand Miles in *North America*, than one hundred Acres in the *Weſt-Indies*. We muſt not ſuppoſe the *French* are as intirely ignorant of their commercial Intereſt, as we ſeem at preſent elevated above the Conſideration of ours.

Whatever this Writer may imagine of our Sufficiency in our Sugar Land, the ingenious Advocate of his Syſtem (the Author of the *Intereſt of the Colonies*) thinks otherwiſe, and formally gives up this fundamental Principle of the Scheme he defends. He declares that he is * far from thinking we have Sugar Land enough, and for this he aſſigns very ſolid † Reaſons. He admits the *Weſt-Indies* to be extremely valuable, not only in our direct Trade, but alſo to that of *North America*. He ſtates the

* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 46. " *I am far from thinking we* " *have Sugar Land enough.*"

† Vid. Int. of Col. p. 46. " *It is often ſaid we have* " *Plenty of Sugar Land ſtill unemployed in* Jamaica: *but thoſe* " *who are well acquainted with that Iſland, know, that the re-* " *maining vacant Land in it is generally ſituated among Moun-* " *tains, Rocks and Gullies, that make Carriage impracticable,* " *ſo that no profitable Uſe can be made of it, unleſs the Price of* " *Sugars ſhould ſo greatly increaſe as to enable the Planters to* " *make very expenſive Roads, by blowing up Rocks, erecting* " *Bridges, &c. every 2 or 300 Yards.*"

the *Weſt-Indian* Trade to be at a Stand *; and that the Scantineſs of our Sugar Plantations will not ſuffer it to extend †. Theſe Admiſſions appear extraordinary in a Piece written with a View to divert us from *Weſt-Indian* Acquiſition, and particularly to depreciate the Value of *Guadaloupe*.

In what Manner he attempts to explain this commercial Paradox, and to reconcile this apparent Contradiction, we ſhall ſee in its Place, aad, I believe, not without ſome Aſtoniſhment.

I have here only to obſerve, that in what I ſhall have occaſion to remark upon this new Syſtem, I ſhall all along attend to the Writer laſt mentioned; becauſe of all thoſe who have written with a View to reverſe our Notions of the *American* Commerce, he is clearly the ableſt, the moſt ingenious, the moſt dexterous, and the moſt perfectly acquainted with the Force and Foible of the Argument; and we may therefore conclude, that he has ſaid every thing, and every thing in the beſt Manner, that the Cauſe could bear.

But before I proceed to lay before the Reader thoſe Conſiderations, which ſeem to me moſt efficacious towards bringing us back to our original, and, I imagine, juſt Notions on this Subject,

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* Vid. Inſt. of Col. p. 35. "*Our Trade to the* Weſt-India *Iſlands is undoubtedly a valuable one; but whatever is the Amount of it, it has long been at a Stand.*"

† "*Limited, as our Sugar Planters are by the Scantineſs of Territories, they cannot increaſe much beyond their preſent Number.*"

I think it not amiſs to ſtate more particularly what theſe Notions were. By this ſtating we ſhall be enabled to diſcern how very far ſome of our modern Politicians have deviated from the Ideas of our Anceſtors, whoſe wiſe Regulations and provident Policy have tranſmitted to us ſo extenſive a Trade, and, on the Baſis of that Trade, ſo ſubſtantial a Power.

The Scheme of Policy purſued by our Anceſtors with regard to our Commerce and Colonies is all comprehended and concentered in the *Act of Navigation*. This Law, which has been juſtly conſidered as the *Magna Charta* of our Trade, carefully provides that *every* Article of the then Produce of the *Weſt-Indies*, and of the Southern Provinces of *North America*, ſhould be exported to * *England* only. With regard to the Northern Provinces of that ſame Continent, the Act has appropriated to *England* no

* The Commodities appropriated to the Mother Country by the 12 Car. II. commonly called enumerated Commodities, are, Sugar, Tobacco, Cotton, Indigo, the dying Woods, and Ginger; Rice and Molaſſes were added in the Reign of Queen *Anne*; and the Legiſlator afterwards entertaining Hopes, that the Continent of *North America* might be rendered uſeful, by the Trade of Naval Stores, appropriated to the Mother Country, all the Kinds of thoſe Stores, by ſpecifying them, together with Iron, Copper Ore, and Furs, among the enumerated Commodities; the Southern Provinces of this Continent only, have anſwered this Expectation, in any tolerable Degree; *Carolina* has produced ſome, but not the beſt, Pitch, Tar, and Turpentine; the other Kinds of Naval Stores ſent hither from *America*, are ſcarce worth mentioning. The great Trade of the Northern Parts is ſtill in Commodities, not enumerated, and there is great Reaſon to fear it will always continue ſo.

no Part of their then Produce but Furs. Under the Direction of the Legiſlator's Jealouſy we may form a Judgment of the Tendency and Strength of his Affections. He found in the Products of the *Weſt-Indies*, and of the Southern continental Provinces, all the Conditions of a perfect *Colony Trade*. 1ſt. The Products were valuable, as well at the home as at the foreign Market. 2dly. By a Poſſibility of effecting a total Obſtruction of their Communication with Foreigners, every Part of the Benefit of the Plantation Produce and Trade was ſecured to the Mother Nation. 3dly. The conſtitutional Dependence was unſhakeably eſtabliſhed by this neceſſary and only Intercourſe with *Great Britain*. And laſtly, which was the leading Object of the Act in all its Regulations, the Seamen employed in this Trade, being, previous to every out, and ſubſequent to every home, Voyage, neceſſarily found in *England*, the Reſources ſought for our naval Power, were at Home and in our own Power. Of this Trade the Legiſlator was therefore not only careful but jealous. As to the Northern Provinces, it was viſible to him, that they could never come directly, nor without many Limitations, under the *commercial Ideas of Colonies*. They could not, except in a few Articles, trade with *England* directly, and therefore muſt often trade with Foreigners. By this original and irremediable Fault in the Nature of their Produce, neither the trading nor the conſtitutionable Dependence

Dependence of thoſe Provinces could be ſo ſolidly and ſo entirely ſecured. Their Shipping and Seamen might grow numerous, and yet add little to the Reſources of the *Engliſh* Navy. They could at beſt in a *trading Light* be conſidered only as *half Colonies*; ſince it was impoſſible to ſubject them to thoſe Regulations, to which the Colonies of every *European* Power are obliged to ſubmit, in order effectually to anſwer the Purpoſes for which Plantations are eſtabliſhed; the true Plantation Trade forming the moſt valuable Object of Commerce to every Country which poſſeſſes it. The Act therefore enterpriſed but little for the Regulation of their Trade: it was not encouraged, becauſe it interfered with our home Trade: and it was not checked, becauſe that Check would have been prejudicial to an innocent People, and becauſe we derived ſome collateral Advantages from it.

The Spirit, therefore, of the Act of Navigation was directly the reverſe of that, which has influenced ſome of our modern Politicians, who have conſidered the northern Provinces on the Continent of *America* as the only Objects deſerving Attention; and have treated with Neglect, and even Contempt, thoſe Objects, which our Anceſtors have taken ſuch great, and almoſt excluſive Care, to provide for, in the moſt leading and important of all their commercial Laws.

I ſhall now proceed to lay before the Reader ſuch Conſiderations, as muſt tend to bring us

back to our original, and, I imagine, true Notions on this Subject.

Having thus ſhewn the Maxims, on which we formerly conducted ourſelves in our commercial Policy, I ſhall now lay before the Reader ſome Conſiderations tending to prove, that, with regard to the *Weſt-Indian* Trade, there is no reaſon at preſent to alter our Syſtem.

The firſt Conſideration which I propoſe on our *Weſt-Indian* Commerce, is its Quantity and Value, even in its bounded State before the War.

The direct Import of *Great Britain* alone from the *Weſt-Indies*, in the Year 1759, a Year ſubject to the Loſſes and Caſualties of War, and excluſive of *Guadaloupe*, which was then but juſt conquered, amounted to no leſs than 1.833,648 l. 16s. 8d. whereas the Import from the great and populous northern Colonies of *New England*, *New York*, and *Penſilvania*, all taken together, amounted but to 70,074 l. 12 s. 3d. and the whole *North American* Import together amounted to little more than a Third of the *Weſt-Indian*.

The ſecond Conſideration relating to the *Weſt-Indian* Commerce, is its comprehenſive and connective Nature: from the many Branches of our Trade that depend upon, and center in it.

With regard to our Dominions in *Europe*, there is ſcarce an Article of *Britiſh* Produce which is not largely conſumed in the *Weſt-Indies*; and there is not in the *Weſt-Indies* any other Source of internal or external Supply, than

than from *Great Britain* and her Colonies. Other Nations, nay, our other Colonies trade with us, and with one another for Conveniency at beſt; the Trade of the *Weſt-Indies* with *Great Britain* is neceſſary to them, neceſſary as their Exiſtence: and they neither have, nor poſſibly can have an Intereſt either in the leaſt diſtinct from, or in the leaſt interfering with ours.

The Benefit of the *Weſt-India* Trade to our *European* Dominions is not confined to *Great Britain*. Our Iſland Colonies, and they alone, take off a large Quantity of Proviſions from *Ireland*; a Conſideration of no trivial Conſequence, not only from the Connection of Intereſt by which that Trade binds together the ſeveral Parts of our Empire, but alſo becauſe, whatever Proviſions go to our own Colonies are ſo much taken from the Markets of our moſt dangerous Rivals, and moſt determined Enemies.

A third Conſideration, and a very weighty one, is, that almoſt the whole of that extenſive and lucrative Trade, which we carry on with the Coaſt of *Africa*, is maintained by, and muſt be put to the Account of the *Weſt-Indies*, becauſe the *Weſt-India* Iſlands form the great Markets for Negroe Slaves.

The Trade to *Africa* is of the very beſt Kind. It is for the greateſt Part fed with our own Manufactures; our Fire Arms, our Ammunition, our Utenſils, our Stuffs, and our Spirits, of all which we exported in the Year 1761 to the Value of 254,381 l. 11s. 5d. What

remains of the Aſſortment for that Market is compoſed entirely of *Eaſt-Indian* Goods, of which in the ſame Year it took off 78,576l. 18s. 6d.

Thus the *Weſt-Indies* ſuſtain, not only a large Share of the direct *Engliſh* Trade, but alſo contribute very conſiderably to the Support of that mighty Pillar of our national Commerce and Credit, the *Eaſt-India* Company. I muſt beg leave to repeat it, and to fix it in the Reader's Memory, that the *African* Trade centers in, and is ſupported by the *Weſt-Indies*; and that this Trade, with its conſequential Advantages, is the principal Dependence of the two after *London*, the greateſt and moſt flouriſhing trading Cities in *Great Britain*, *Briſtol* and *Liverpool*.

There is another Conſideration relative to this Trade, ſtill more important in itſelf, and more eſſential in the preſent Examination, becauſe it will point out to us how ill we conſult the Intereſt of *North America* herſelf, either relatively to her own particular Proſperity, or to her Intercourſe with us, when we happen, as I conceive we have in this Treaty, to neglect the *Weſt-Indian* Commerce.

For ſeveral of the moſt conſiderable Commodities of *North America*, particularly of the moſt northern Parts, their Plank, their Lumber, their Staves, their Proviſion, there exiſts no other Market whatever, than the *Weſt-Indian* Iſlands; for their Corn and their Fiſh, it is the neareſt and beſt they can find. It will be neceſſary further to obſerve, that theſe Commodities,

Commodities, being groſs and bulky, employ a very great Number of Veſſels; and theſe Veſſels again are not only the Carriers of their Commodities, but are alſo themſelves a Commodity of great Conſideration, and form one of the moſt lucrative Branches of the *North American* Trade. In a Word, it is by Means of the *Weſt-Indian* Trade that a great Part of *North America* is at all enabled to trade with us, for they principally pay the Ballance due to *Great Britain*, which otherwiſe they could never pay, out of this Fund; either in Caſh, or in Bills drawn by the *Weſt-Indian* Merchant on *London*, or in the Return of *Weſt-Indian* Produce on their own Account; for the Ballance in this Trade is always conſiderably in their Favour.

That this Conſideration, and the Inference drawn from it, is not puſhed too far to ſerve a preſent Purpoſe in Argument, I ſhall evince, by ſhewing that the ſame Conſideration was made, and the ſame Conſequence inferred, many Years ſince, by a very able Writer on Trade, and long before this Controverſy exiſted. "As "our northern Colonies, ſays this judicious "Writer, anſwer their Returns to *Great* "*Britain*, by Means chiefly of our Sugar "Iſlands, it ſhews plainly how much it be-"hoves us to ſecure and preſerve, *increaſe* and "encourage, the Sugar Iſlands; for without "our ſouthern Plantations, our northern Co-"lonies can be of no real Advantage to us, "ſince what they at preſent are muſt ceaſe

"on

" on the Decay, or Loſs of the Sugar Iſlands, " from whence *their Value to* Great Britain " *chiefly ariſes*, and for Want of which they " would be otherwiſe *prejudicial Colonies to* " *their Mother-country* *."

So that in Reality the Trade of theſe *North American* Provinces, when ſtated in its true Light, is, as well as that of *Africa*, to be regarded but as a dependent Member, and ſubordinate Department of the *Weſt-Indian* Trade; it muſt riſe and fall exactly as the *Weſt-Indies* flouriſh or decay.

I hope I cannot be ſo far miſunderſtood, as if I meant to deny the Importance of our continental Colonies; I am, on the contrary, extremely ſenſible of their Value, and affected with an unfeigned Zeal for their Proſperity; but I ſhould be ſorry it were found to be a Zeal without Knowledge. I know that the Inſular and Continental Colonies of *America*, are reciprocally beneficial to each other; but the Benefit, though reciprocal, is not equal. The *Weſt-Indies* might be ſupplied directly from *England*, with moſt of the Articles which come from our northern Plantations, though, I admit, neither quite ſo cheap, nor with ſo much Convenience. I might add, that from the very improved State of Agriculture and Paſturage in our *European* Dominions, our Sugar Colonies would ſuffer much leſs from a Deficiency in *North America*, than thoſe of *France*, to whoſe Proſperity the Trade with the *Engliſh* northern

* *Vide* Survey of Trade, publiſhed in 1718, Page 149.

northern Colonies is more neceſſary by fathan it is to the *Engliſh Weſt-Indies*; which might flouriſh, though the northern Eſtabliſhments did not exiſt. On the other hand it is certain, if the *Weſt-India* Market was taken away, theſe northern Colonies muſt of Neceſſity loſe more than Three-fourths of their whole Trade; and a Trade of the more Importance to them, and to the Welfare of the Mother-country; the Ballance being, as I think I have before obſerved, very greatly, and very uniformly, in their Favour. It is not to depreciate the *North American* Trade, that I have made theſe Obſervations, but merely to ſet it in its proper Place in our commercial Syſtem; for a Conſideration of Things out of their due Order, is often worſe than no Conſideration of them at all.

The *Weſt-India* being the great *direct* Trade, and that, through which the Ballance of all is paid to *England*; that Trade, of which our Anceſtors in the Act of Navigation, the Parent of all our Trade, ſhewed ſuch extreme Jealouſy, and of which alone they ſhewed any Jealouſy, muſt in Reaſon be conſidered as the primary Object in the Syſtem of our Colonies. Thoſe ſubordinate Syſtems of Commerce, which exiſt by adminiſtring to the Support of that primary Trade, as thoſe of *Africa* and *North America*, muſt always be conſidered in a ſecondary Light, and as they are connected to that of the *Weſt-Indies*, in whoſe Orbit they muſt move: and nothing can be ſo capitally and prepoſterouſly abſurd,

as

as to form Schemes for the Extenſion of our Dominions in *North America* and *Africa*, on a Plan excluſive of the *Weſt-Indies*. It would be almoſt as rational to think of fattening a Beaſt, after you had ſewed up his Mouth.

I muſt further obſerve on the relative Value, to *Great Britain*, of our *Weſt-Indian* and northern Colonies, that the Duties impoſed on Sugar form no contemptible Object in our Revenue. No one Commodity of *North America*, except Tobacco (and that is the Growth of only *Virginia* and *Maryland)* is in the leaſt ſubſervient, either there or here, to our Expences, and to the Support of the general Intereſt.

But beſides the Duties which the *Weſt-Indian* Produce pays in *Great Britain*, there is alſo a *Britiſh* Duty paid in the *Weſt-Indies*. I ſpeak here of the Four and a Half *per Cent*. Duty, paid on the Spot by all Commodities of the Growth of the *Leſſer Antilles*. From this Duty near forty thouſand Pounds a Year comes into the Treaſury. This is a direct Tribute which the *Weſt-Indies* pay to us for our Protection. None of our northern continental Colonies pay any thing of this Sort; and ſome of them, after immenſe and almoſt incredible Sums expended on them, are ſtill burthenſome.

Before I cloſe this Article, I think it not amiſs to remark upon an Extract from the *Cuſtom-houſe* Entries, cited in the Poſtſcript to the Pamphlet I have already ſo often mentioned, which was wrote purely with a View to depreciate our *Weſt-Indian* Iſlands, and to

exaggerate the Importance of *North America*, in a Light independent of the *Weſt-Indies*.

We there find * the Export to the *Weſt-Indies* in the Year 1758, to have been but 877,571 l. 19 s. 11 d. whereas that, to *North America*, amounted to 1.832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d.

In order to diſcover the extreme Fallacy of this Proceeding, you muſt obſerve that, while he diſplays the *Britiſh* Export to *North America*, and to the *Weſt-Indies*, he takes due Care intirely to ſink the Import, that is to ſay, the Returns to *Great Britain* from both. He ſhews you indeed where the *Britiſh* Goods go; but he neither ſhews you from whence, nor by what Means, they are paid for. The Author is, to do him juſtice, too knowing in his Subject to have made this Omiſſion through Inadvertency. It is eaſily accounted for.

If he had given a fair State of our Exports to, and Imports from *North America* and the *Weſt-Indies* reſpectively, the Account would have ſtood thus:

	l.	s.	d.		l.	s.	d.
Exports to *North America*,	1.832,948	13	10	Imports from the *Weſt-Indies*,	1.834,036	2	2
Imports from *North America*,	648,683	0	4	Exports to the *Weſt-Indies*,	877,571	19	11
Deficiency of Imports, being a Ballance due to *Great Britain* from *N. America*,	1.184,265	13	6	Exceſs of Imports, being a Ballance *due* from *Great Britain* to the *Weſt Indies*.	956,464	2	3

* *Vide* Int. of Col. Page 57.

And from ſuch a fair State of thoſe Trades two Things muſt have appeared; firſt, that the Returns made by *North America* to *Great Britain* are exceſſively inferior to what *North America* receives from hence, whereby a *Ballance ſtands againſt North America* of no leſs than 1.184,265*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* And as we know that *North America* contains no Mines of Gold or Silver, the Reader muſt naturally have inquired by what Means this Ballance was made up to *Great Britain*; and this Enquiry would have led his Attention to the *Weſt-Indian* Trade; the fair State of which would have diſcovered the ſecond Thing, *viz.* that contrary to the Caſe of *North America*, the Returns made by the *Weſt-Indies* to *Great Britain* are exceſſively ſuperior to what the *Weſt-Indies* receive from hence, whereby *a Ballance ſtands for the Weſt Indies*, of no leſs than 956,464 *l.* 2*s.* 3*d.* Now as it is well known that we never ſend Treaſure to the *Weſt-Indies* to make up this Ballance (on the contrary we receive a great deal from thence) it would as naturally be aſked how this Overplus on the Side of the *Weſt-Indies* was anſwered and ballanced on the Side of *Great Britain*; and this, upon Examination, would appear to have been done by three Ways.

Firſt, By our *Weſt-Indies* taking upon themſelves the Payment of a very large Part of that exceſſive *North American* Deficiency, a Fact that would clearly have ſhewn the Dependence of *North America* on that Trade, without which our *North American* Colonies could never pay

for, nor conſequently take off, our Manufactures.

Secondly, In paying for almoſt the whole *African* Trade, by which their Importance in another Light would have become evident. And,

Thirdly, In the very great Sums ſpent by the *Weſt-Indian* Planters reſident in *England*; whereas we derive ſcarce any Advantage of that Kind, none I am ſure that is worth mentioning, from any of the continental Plantations to the Northward.

All this, I ſay, would have appeared from a fair and ballanced State of the Exports to, and Imports from, *North America* and the *Weſt-Indies*; and this, inſtead of lowering, would have raiſed the vaſt Importance of the *Weſt-India* Plantations. Whereas, from the imperfect, and therefore fallacious State of it, given by that Writer, an inattentive, uninformed Reader might be apt to imagine, that *Great Britain* had no other Advantage from the *Weſt-Indies*, than ſimply what aroſe from her Exports thither; than which Suppoſition nothing can be more groundleſs.

This Writer goes ſtill further; and, as it were in Triumph, proceeds to ſhew how ſmall the proportional Increaſe of the *Weſt-India* Trade has been to that of *North America*. This is, I believe, very lamentably true; but after what has been ſaid, the Reader, I imagine, will of himſelf draw a Concluſion from it diametrically oppoſite to that Gentleman's Wiſhes *. He will ſee (for even that Gentleman

* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 35.

will inform him) that our *Weſt-India* Trade has been cramped *merely for Want of Land*, and not for Want of Market. Whereas the *North American* Trade has extended, becauſe it had Land ſufficient to bear ſuch an Extent for Ages to come, and becauſe it found a Market, not indeed in the *Engliſh*, but in the *French Sugar Colonies*, which had alſo increaſed abundantly, becauſe they (the *French*) had Land in Abundance, in the *Weſt-Indies*. Common Senſe would dictate to us the Scheme of Acquiſition where we wanted, not where we did not want; and the ſame plain Guide would direct us to prefer that Plan, which, by the Operation of one ſingle Principle, muſt extend our Trade where it was limited, and rectify it, where it was wrong directed. Acquiſition in the *Weſt-Indies* muſt increaſe our limited and decaying Sugar Trade, and at the ſame time recall our, extenſive indeed, but erring Trade of *North America*, from *French* to *Engliſh* Markets.

This ſingle Conſideration might ſeem ſufficient to enforce the Propriety, I had almoſt ſaid Neceſſity, of making Acquiſitions in the *Weſt-Indies* even in Preference, had that been the Diſpute, as it was not, to continental Acquiſitions; but there is another Conſideration reſulting from the ſame Fact, which in my Opinion is ſtill more cogent.

This Author has ſhewn, that our Export to the *Weſt-Indies*, is greatly inferior to our Export to the northern Colonies. But he has, perhaps,

perhaps, more artfully, than ingenuouſly, omitted the Proportion of the Inhabitants, who call for theſe Exports. In all the *Britiſh* Iſlands it will be difficult to raiſe the Whites to 90,000; Now if in the Year 1758, theſe 90,000 conſumed 877,571l. 19s. 11d. and the Inhabitants of *North America*, who exceed a Million and an half, took off, according to his own ſtating of the Queſtion, but 1.832,948l. 13s. 10d. it appears at a Glance that one Man in the *Weſt-Indies* is worth to the Trade of the Mother Country as much as eight are worth in *North America*, which ſhews how much more valuable the Trade of the *Weſt-Indies* is, than the Trade of *North America*, in Proportion to the Number of Inhabitants; and if we were to take in the Extent of Territory, we ſhould be loſt in the Diſproportion. From theſe Facts, furniſhed by that Author for a direct contrary Purpoſe, we muſt neceſſarily infer it to be our Intereſt, not indeed to contract, or in any-wiſe neglect our continental Poſſeſſions, but to attend to the Increaſe of thoſe between the Tropicks, as the primary and leading Object of our Policy.

To return, I have ſhewn that the *Weſt-Indian* Trade is almoſt the ſole Support of the *African*; the principal Support of the *North American*; a moſt beneficial Market for the *Eaſt-Indian*; and a very great Conſumer of our Home Commodities. Can any thing more irreſiſtibly direct us where we are bound, if

our

our national Intereſt conſtitutes our political Obligations, to acquire and to keep? eſpecially when we take into our Conſideration a Matter, in my Opinion, abſolutely deciſive in this Controverſy, that, in *North America*, we had Land without Bounds, and a very contracted Market, and that, with Regard to the *Weſt-Indies*, we had a Market without Limits, and Means of ſupplying it altogether diſproportioned.

The Reader will not forget that the Foundation of the Treaty was an *uti poſſidetis*. The *French* admitted our Poſſeſſion for a Right, they did not even deſire any Reſtitution for which they did not profeſs to pay a full and juſt Equivalent; *France* left the Valuation of the Equivalent to ourſelves. If any Offer of theirs appeared unequal to what they aſked in Return, we were left at Liberty to retain our Poſſeſſion, for the Barter was only to take place on a Suppoſition of mutual Conveniency. This was admitted to be the governing Principle of all the Exchanges and Equivalents propoſed in that Treaty.

Now, whether *Minorca* can be conſidered as a full and juſt Equivalent for *Guadaloupe*, which was to have been ceded in Exchange for it by that Treaty, is what I propoſe to examine; and this I ſhall do by ſtating, to the utmoſt of my Knowledge, and the beſt of my Judgment, the Advantages of both.

The Advantages of *Minorca* were either political or commercial. The political Advantages, which we were ſaid to derive from that Iſland,

Iſland, were, that by the Poſſeſſion of the fortified Harbour of *Mahon*, we awed the pyratical States of *Barbary*; that we made ourſelves reſpectable to the *Italian* Powers; and that we were better able in Times of War to ſupport the Operations of our Allies, and diſtreſs the *Mediterranean* Trade of the Enemy.

Theſe Advantages were undoubtedly in ſome Degree real, and in ſome Degree important. Let them ſtand at their full Value; but at the ſame Time let it be remembered, that at the very Beginning of this War, we loſt *Minorca*; and that by this Loſs, from that Time to this Moment, now near ſix Years, we have ſcarce felt the leaſt Prejudice in any of the above-mentioned Inſtances. We ſtill awed the *African* States, we ſtill preſerved the Reſpect of the *Italian* Powers, and we abundantly damaged the Enemy's Trade; the Poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar* proved fully ſufficient for all theſe Purpoſes.

The commercial Advantages of *Minorca* are very eaſily enumerated; they conſiſted in one ſingle, and that no very conſiderable, Article. The *Minorquins* ſent hither the Value of about 500*l.* annually of an ordinary and little eſteemed Wine. This was the whole of the Commerce they carried on with *Great Britain*, except that in return they took ſome few of our Manufactures, but not to half the Value of the Money which we ourſelves had before ſent thither, to pay our Garriſon.

Againſt

Againſt this reſpectable Return, it will be neceſſary to ballance the Expence of keeping the Object of ſo deſirable a Commerce. In the Year 1753, a Time of profound Peace, it appears by the publick Accounts, that the military Eſtabliſhment of this Iſland coſt the Nation 74,293 l. The civil Government had wholly ſwallowed up its own little Revenue. In the Year 1742, a Year of War, the Expence aroſe to 84,231 l. I only ſtate the current Expence; the immenſe Sums from Time to Time expended on the Fortifications are totally omitted. From this Idea of the Value of *Minorca*, we may in Part eſtimate the Damage we ſuſtained by the Loſs, and the Solicitude we ought to ſhew for the Recovery, of this Poſſeſſion. By loſing *Minorca*, we loſt 500 l. *per Annum* in our groſs Trade, and we acquired to the Revenue at the loweſt Rate 74,293 l. The political Advantages of *Minorca* are in a great meaſure, if not entirely, ſupplied by *Gibraltar*; and in the commercial Light, the Loſs of that Iſland has been an annual Saving to the Nation of the Intereſt of above two Millions of our national Debt.

Let us ſuppoſe, that by this Treaty we were to have made no Sacrifices at all, in Return for this Iſland; but that the *French* had freely agreed to ſurrender *Minorca* without any Compenſation; may it not be Matter of ſome Doubt, whether, even in that Caſe, it would have been very clearly, or at leaſt very materially, our Intereſt to accept their Offer. In whatſoever Manner this Doubt may be reſolved, I am confident

it

it would be the Intereſt of *France*, rather to give it up for nothing, than to continue at the Expence of an Incumbrance, without Dignity or Profit, and which can add nothing whatſoever to their Commerce, their Strength, or their Reputation.

But they were ſenſible of our Foible, they were not ſo diſintereſted as to part even with an Incumbrance, without obliging us to pay an high Price for it; but they took care, however, not to imitate our Conduct, when an Object of the like Kind came to be offered on our Side, and to be valued by them. Though we had the Generoſity to purchaſe an Incumbrance from them, they refuſed in their Turn to diſburthen us at their own Charge, and they declared that they knew *Belleiſle* could be of no Uſe * to us, and they dealt accordingly; they left us *Belleiſle*, they would bid nothing for it, and having ‡ refuſed to ſet any Value upon it, they compelled us to admit the Inſignificance of that Poſſeſſion, by our yielding it without any Compenſation whatſoever.

They were, on the other Side, too wiſe not to make an Advantage of our Predilection. They affected to raiſe *Minorca* to Conſideration,

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* Vid. Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg. P. 27. " *France thought* " *the keeping of* Belliefle *would be more expenſive than profitable* " *to* England."

‡ Vid. Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg. N° 22. Art. 6. " *It* " *ſeems as if* England *offered* Belleiſle *for* Minorca, *as* " France *does not allow the Importance of* Belleiſle, *the two* " *Courts will retain their ſeveral Opinions*, England *ſhall* " *maintain her Conqueſt, and* France *ſhall have* Minorca."

by the Price they demanded for it, and required for one of the worſt Iſlands in *Europe*, two as well circumſtanced for Trade, as any in the *Weſt-Indies*.

To ſet the Propriety of this Exchange in its full Light, I ſhall take a very ſhort, but I hope, a very ſatisfactory Method. I ſhall begin with laying before the Reader a naked Fact, a Table of the Value of the Commodities imported in one Year from *Guadaloupe* into *England*. On this I ſhall afterwards make a few explanatory Remarks.

Produce of Guadaloupe *at the* Engliſh *Market, from Chriſtmas* 1760, *to Chriſtmas* 1761, *at the prime Coſt.*

Commodities	Value. *l.*	*s.*	*d.*
Cocoa Nuts	11,497	0	0
Coffee	66,261	16	3
Caſſia Fiſtula	3,100	8	0
Tamarinds	17	5	0
Dry Ginger	2,713	19	0
Sugar	405,022	4	0
Cow Hides	508	4	0
Indigo	462	18	0
Cordial Waters	27	0	0
Rum	775	0	0
Succades	90	19	6
Cotton	112,792	10	0
	603,269	3	9

The Importance of this Iſland is not, like that of ſome other of our Poſſeſſions, a Subject of political Reaſonings, and a Topic of idle Speculation. Here is a commercial Object of above 600,000 l. yearly Value. It would be as ridiculous, as unjuſt, to accuſe the Writer of a partial Attachment to, or a fond Preference of,

of, this Object, ſince the Greatneſs of it is no longer a Matter of Opinion, but of Account, and of an Account too moſt moderately ſtated, ſince it does not take in the whole Value of that Iſland, but of its Exports to *England* only, as that alone could hitherto be exactly aſcertained.

But I muſt inform the Reader, 1ſt. That the two principal Ports of *Scotland*, *Glaſgow* and *Leith*, have carried on a very conſiderable Trade with this Iſland.

2dly. That the Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* continue to carry on a greater Trade, than any *Engliſh* Iſland does, with *North America*, where they diſpoſe of their Molaſſes, as they have not as yet fallen into the Method of making Rum, which the Policy of *France* did not ſuffer her Iſlands to make, leſt that Spirit ſhould interfere with the Brandies of *France*; but certainly this will be a very conſiderable Article of Export from *Guadaloupe* to *Great Britain*, if we retain that Iſland.

3dly. In this Year the Enemy took a great Number of Ships, and ſome very valuable ones, coming from *Guadaloupe* to *England*. I am ſure it will be a very moderate Computation to ſtate them at no more than 50,000l. Whatever the Value of them might have been, the Reader muſt ſee that there is juſt ſo much Loſs to the Table I have given above of the Exports of *Guadaloupe* to *England*.

Theſe three Articles, though it is impoſſible

to aſcertain their juſt Extent, are yet neceſſarily to be taken into the Account of the Value of *Guadaloupe*. They are as much Facts, though not accurately defined, as any one Article ſtated in the Account itſelf.

In every Argument concerning the Commerce of the *Weſt-Indies*, it is common to lay the principal Streſs upon the Sugar Produce. It is certainly relied on with great Reaſon, becauſe being a groſs Commodity, it increaſes our Tonnage: Being low in its original Price, it becomes a proper Baſis for heavy Duties, and being of very large Demand, muſt have a proportionable Effect in the general Ballance of Trade. But this I apprehend is not much diſputed. The Importance of this Article is indeed ſo highly rated, that our *Weſt-Indian* Plantations are, in common Acceptation, conſidered merely as Sugar Iſlands; the Advocates for an Extent of Territory, in that Part of the World, have hitherto dwelt almoſt wholly upon the Benefit of ſupplying foreign Markets with this Commodity.

But without derogating at all from the Value of this rich Production, there is another Article, the Produce of the *Weſt-Indies* in general, and of *Guadaloupe* in particular, which I think not inferior even to Sugar (poſſibly it may be of ſtill greater commercial Conſequence) and to which I therefore wiſh more immediately to direct the Reader's Attention. I mean Cotton; of which we ſee *Guadaloupe* ſent us laſt Year to the Value of 112,792l. 10s.

Our

Our Manufactures employ annually about 13,000 Bags of this Commodity. Before the Acquiſition of *Guadaloupe*, our own Colonies did by no Means anſwer our Demands; our great Supply came from the *Levant*. For the greateſt Part therefore of all the Cotton we uſed, we depended upon Strangers; we depended upon a Country ſo frequently infeſted with the Plague, that nothing could be more precarious than the Supply: we depended upon a Country too, to which we ſent but a ſmall Proportion of our Manufactures, and a vaſt Ballance in ready Money.

Theſe Diſadvantages in the Supply of Cotton from the *Levant*, deſerve our moſt ſerious Attention, as they ſtrike ſometimes at the very Being of a conſiderable Manufacture, and at all times keep it in a precarious and dependent State; for as often as the Crops in the Eaſt happened to fail, as they frequently did, we have in that Caſe before this War, been always ſupplied from the *French Weſt-Indian* Iſlands through the Hands of the *Dutch*, who, as they ſupplied the Market, ſo of Conſequence they regulated the Price, and allowed the Cotton to us only at ſuch an advanced Rate, as made it impoſſible for us to carry our Manufactures to Market on equal Terms with themſelves, and much leſs with the *French*.

The Report of the Houſe of Commons upon the Application of thoſe concerned in the Cotton and Linnen Manufacture, about twelve Years ago, throws a great Light upon this Subject.

The

The Report ſets forth, that a great Part of the Manufactures of *Lancaſhire*, are compoſed of Cotton and of Linnen Yarn, and that the *Dutch* and *French* have the Linnen Yarn at a much cheaper Rate than our *Engliſh* Manufacturers. Now it is certain, that nothing but the low Price of Cotton can enable us to afford ſo high a Price for Linnen Yarn; for if we muſt pay an high Price for each of the two *only* Materials which compoſe this Manufacture, it is impoſſible for us to go to Market with either the Cotton or the mixed Commodity on a Par with thoſe who command the Materials of both at their own Price. This is no Speculation, we know from Experience what we actually have ſuffered by this Defect in our Colonies. About twelve Years ago, on account of a Plague in the *Levant*, our Import of Cotton from thence became altogether inſufficient to anſwer our Demands; our own *Weſt-Indies* could by no Means make up the Deficiency. In this our Emergency, the *Dutch*, as appears from the Report of that Committee, beſtirred themſelves with ſuch Activity, Boldneſs, and Succeſs, as to threaten the Deſtruction of all our Manufactures which depended on Cotton.

A like Failure happened in the Crops of the *Levant* in 1760. We did not that Year import above 1,900 Bags from the *Levant*, from whence in ſome Years we imported 10,000; but was the Conſequence the ſame laſt Year as in the ſame Circumſtances it had been twelve Years before? far from it: *Guadaloupe* in this Emergency threw 5,013 Bags of Cotton into our Scale, which was

was then on the Point of kicking the Beam, and our Manufactures have uninterruptedly proceeded. The Schemes of Monopoly formed by the *Dutch* were baffled, though they had in the Year 1761 ten times their former Advantages, and were not under the Neceſſity as formerly in ‡ armed Veſſels to force a Trade with the *French*, who, inſtead of oppoſing them, now invited them to their Market. *Guadaloupe* then, I ſay, broke the Meaſures of the *Dutch*, and in this very laſt Year reſcued a conſiderable Manufacture from impending Ruin. In that Year *Guadaloupe* produced 5000 Bags, which is double the Quantity of Cotton which *Jamaica*, the greateſt and richeſt of our Iſlands, ever produced in one Year. That wealthy and flouriſhing Iſland ſent home in that Year but 2125 Bags, not half the Produce of *Guadaloupe*; and by Retroſpect for ſeveral Years to the Produce of *Jamaica*, it is evident that the Cotton Produce of that Iſland rather declines than increaſes; a Circumſtance which ſeems, I think, plainly to mark in that Iſland ſome natural

‡ Vide p. 21. of the Report from the Committee relating to the chequered and ſtriped Linnens in the Year 1751, there is this Extract from a Letter from *Antigua*.

Antigua, Feb. 4, 1750-1.

" *Governor* Heyliger *has already engaged the greater Part* " *of what Cotton is made in the* Daniſh *Iſlands*, Santa Cruz, " St. John's, St. Thomas, *beſides the vaſt Quantities* " *of that Commodity he daily imports at* St. Euſtatia *from the* " French *Iſlands in three large Sloops of his, that force a* " *Trade with the Inhabitants of the* French *Iſlands.---He is* " *at this Expence to come at Cotton.*"

natural or political Unfitneſs for this Production; whereas the Growth of Cotton in *Guadaloupe* continually increaſes; and I may venture to aſſert, that there is an high Probability if kept in our Hands, that this Article, as well as every other, will at leaſt double, ſince not a Third of the Land convenient to Ports and capable of Cultivation is yet cleared, and ſcarce any is fully ſlaved.

In one Word, this ſingle Article of *Guadaloupian* Produce, is near treble the Value of all the Produce of all the Acquiſitions we were to have made by Treaty; and, did it produce nothing elſe, it is, even in this reſpect, a moſt deſireable Object.

If therefore it be our Intereſt with as much Cheapneſs, with as great Certainty, and with as little Diſadvantage as poſſible in the Ballance of Trade, to furniſh ourſelves with Cotton, it is as plain, that this can be done effectually, only by retaining in our Hands, and by improving to the utmoſt of our Abilities, thoſe Places, which, from the preſent State of their actual Export, diſcover an Aptitude in the Soil, and in the Diſpoſition of the Inhabitants, to raiſe a Commodity ſo neceſſary to our Manufactures.

If we had as minutely informed ourſelves concerning the Importance of this Conqueſt, as a People attentive to their Intereſt, and jealous of their commercial Advantages, ought to have done, we could hardly have thought of affording *Guadaloupe* ſo low a Place in the Scale of our Acquiſitions.

The

The ingenious Author of the *Intereſt* was of opinion, that the Acquiſition of *Guadaloupe* could prove no Remedy for the * Scantineſs of Land ſo juſtly complained of, even by himſelf, in our *Weſt-Indies*. I hope he will now be induced to change his Opinion, when he finds that the Produce of this Colony alone is already worth above 600,000l. a Year; that it is very near equal to the Produce of all the reſt of the *Engliſh Leward* Iſlands; that even laſt Year it amounted to more than a Third of the Whole of what we imported from all our old *Weſt-India* Plantations put together. It is very well known to every Gentleman in that Trade, that the Produce of *Guadaloupe* has this Year exceeded the Produce of the laſt, as the Produce of the laſt did that of the Year before; and as probably the next will the Produce of this. In the *Engliſh* Hands it will be, for an Age to come, the very beſt Market for Slaves; and will for ever continue a very good one, not only for that Article but for the Conſumption of all Sorts of *Britiſh* Manufactures.

Another Conjecture of this ingenious Writer's on this Subject, is likewiſe overturned by Fact. He is of Opinion, that probably † none, or a very

* *Vide* Int. Page 46. "*Though I am far from thinking* "*we have Sugar Land enough, I cannot think* Guadaloupe "*is ſo deſirable an Increaſe of it.*"

† Int. of Col. Page. 46. ſpeaking of our keeping *Guadaloupe*, and exporting its Sugars, he ſays, "*Perhaps the amazing* "*Increaſe of* Engliſh *Conſumption, might ſtop moſt of it here.*"

very ſmall Quantity, of the Sugars of *Guadaloupe* will be exported. If he will give himſelf the Trouble to enquire, he will find that they are nearly *all* exported, together with the whole of the Coffee, of which Commodity we ſee this Iſland produces to the Value of 66,261 l. 16 s. 3 d.

But if neither Sugar, nor Coffee, were exported, but the Whole of each Commodity was employed in the Home Conſumption; yet would it not be ſtill a very material Point, that our own Products in one Part of our Dominions, ſhould pay for our Products in another, inſtead of our being obliged to pay ready Money for them in foreign Markets?

Here I muſt remark with ſome Concern a Miſtake, which the ſame ingenious Writer has been, I know not how, led into; namely, that this Iſland will not take off above ‡ 100,000 l. of our Manufactures.

If the Trade of *Guadaloupe* were in Reality confined within even thoſe narrow Limits, I conceive, that the entire Carriage, and mercantile Profit, of 603,269 l. 3 s. 9 d. of Produce, the Uſe of above 5,000 Bags of Cotton for our Manufactures, and the certain Conſumption of even 100,000 l. of our *Britiſh* Commodities, would make this a moſt valuable Conqueſt, and worthy of our moſt ſerious Attention. But on what

‡ Int. of Col. Page 47. "*Though our own Colonies expend* "*among us almoſt the whole Produce of our Sugar, can we, or* "*ought we, to promiſe ourſelves this will be the Caſe? In* "Guadaloupe, 100,000 l. *will ſupply them with* Britiſh "*Manufactures.*"

what Grounds has this Author been pleaſed to circumſcribe the Export to *Guadaloupe* within theſe Limits? Fact in this, as in all his other Predictions, ſpeaks directly againſt him. The Negroes, ſold there this Year, are not fewer than 4,000; which, at only 30 l. a Head, amounts to £120,000 l. In this ſingle Article alone, we have 20,000 l. more than this Gentleman is pleaſed to allow to the whole Conſumption of *Britiſh* Manufactures. I ſpeak of Negroes as perfectly equivalent to *Britiſh* Manufactures, or to Commodities exported from *Great Britain* on Account of *Guadaloupe*; for whether the *Britiſh* Export is ſent to *Guadaloupe*, or exchanged in *Africa* for Slaves for the uſe of *Guadaloupe*, certainly the Export from hence is equally to be put to the Account of *Guadaloupe*. I have not been able to procure the Export from *Great Britain*, correſpondent in point of Time to the Import given above; but in the Year 1760, the very Year after the Reduction of the Iſland, the direct Export from hence had already amounted to £118,569 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d* and I muſt deſire the Reader to obſerve, that *Guadaloupe* has, beſides, been the Market for all the *French* Prize Goods taken in the *Weſt-Indies*. The Preciſion, however, which I have preſcribed to myſelf, precludes me from bringing this into the Account, as it is impoſſible here to aſcertain exactly the Value or Quantity of thoſe Goods, which has however been very conſiderable. But excluſive of theſe

Prize Goods, and admitting, contrary to fact, the immediate Export from hence, to have been no greater for the laſt, or for the current, Year than what I have ſtated for the firſt Year after its Reduction; yet this, joined to the *Britiſh* Export employed for *Guadaloupe* in the Slave Trade, (which I have under calculated) will raiſe the Demand of *Britiſh* Produce and Labour, occaſioned by our Poſſeſſion of this Iſland, to 238,569*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* and to this if we add, as we muſt, the Freightage, the Commiſſion, the Merchant's Profit on the Sale of the *Britiſh* Commodities there, and the returned Advantages of all the Produce in the Import hither, and in the Re-export abroad, in the Manufacture at home, and in the Expence of thoſe who come to *London* on their Affairs, it will appear to a Demonſtration how extremely lucrative to *England* this Iſland is, even in its preſent State of imperfect Subjection and imperfect Cultivation. In this Manner conjectures are anſwered by Facts; and when this Writer ſpeaks of a Conqueſt over a † People of different Language, Manners, and Religion, as not worth having; and of its Value as overballanced by the Expence of keeping it, he muſt allude to ſome other Conqueſt, and not to

† *Vide* Int. Page 46. "*A Country fully* inhabited *by* "*any Nation, is no proper Poſſeſſion for another of different* "*Language, Manner, and Religion: It is hardly ever tenable* "*at leſs Expence than it is worth.*"

to *Guadaloupe*; for we know that the Expence of keeping *Guadaloupe*, even now in Time of War, and when the Iſland is entirely *French*, is infinitely inferior to the Advantages which we derive from its Commerce. No Difficulty is found in keeping the unwarlike *Weſt-Indian French*, in due Obedience. On a Peace our Situation will be ſtill more favourable. I venture to ſay, that one Regiment will be fully ſufficient for its internal Defence.

This Author indeed, knows, that with *Canada* in our Poſſeſſion we muſt ſtill for hundreds of Miles border on the *French*, or *Spaniards* ‡; "*That the People inhabiting the Frontiers, are generally the Refuſe of both Nations, remote from the Eye, the Prudence, and the Reſtraint of Government.*" He knows and tells us, that a ‖ "*vaſt Wilderneſs, thinly or ſcarce at all peopled, conceals with Eaſe the March of Troops and Workmen. Important Paſſes may be ſeized within our Limits*"; and knowing all this, his Apprehenſions for the vaſt Expence, neceſſary to retain a conquered Country, if applied to *Canada*, are reaſonable and well-founded; but if applied to *Guadaloupe*, they are altogether ill-founded and unreaſonable. It is extraordinary, that ſo ingenious, ſo ſenſible a Man ſhould ſo confound all Ideas as to ſuppoſe, the ſame Dangers, which may exiſt in *Canada*, a vaſt, wild, uncommercial, inland Country, of an extenſive Frontier, and retired from the Eye of Goverſhment, are to

‡ Vide, *Int. Page* 9. ‖ *Vide* Int. Page 5.

to be at all dreaded in *Guadaloupe*, an Iſland, divided from every Neighbour, and where all lies immediately under the Eye of Government; a Country, which is one great Scene of Commerce, and which holds not one ſingle Circumſtance in common with *Canada*. *Guadaloupe*, in the natural Courſe of Things, muſt in a few Years be almoſt wholly *Engliſh*; and, if ſuch is the Conſumption of our Manufactures in its preſent imperfect State of Culture, whilſt the Idea of their being reſtored to *France* preſerves a ſtrong hold on the Imagination of the Inhabitants, and therefore reſtrains the Demand for *Engliſh* Manufactures; (a Reſtraint which muſt make them a very rich *immediate* * Treaſure indeed, to whichever Nation they may fall at the Concluſion of a Peace.) If ſuch, I ſay, is already the Conſumption of our Manufactures at *Guadaloupe* under theſe unfavourable Circumſtances, what muſt it be, when the greater Part of the Inhabitants come to be *Engliſh*, and have no other Market, no other Government, to hope for? The Objections this Gentleman mentions, lie equally againſt every Conqueſt, which has hitherto been deemed valuable amongſt

* The *French* Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* have moſt certainly at this Day in their Poſſeſſion more Gold in Specie, than is to be found in all our other Leward Iſlands put together. The far greater Part of this Treaſure muſt, immediately upon a Peace, of neceſſity in one Tide flow in upon that Country which ſhall then be Maſter of *Guadaloupe*.

amongſt Mankind. According to ſuch Politicians, we are not to take Advantage of the Induſtry and Wealth of new Subjects, becauſe we muſt live in Fear of their Diſaffection; and they notably think, that Nations may be made great and powerful, upon Principles which are founded on Suſpicion, and Cowardice.

This Writer, however, on maturer Deliberation, ſeems to give up, in ſome meaſure, his Objection, and acknowledges the Value of *Guadaloupe*, provided it be not || bought too dear. What does he think of *Minorca* as a proper Purchaſe for it, ſuppoſing we had not reſolved to ſurrender it, without any Equivalent at all.

Let us come to the comparative Eſtimation of theſe Objects. We agreed to exchange an Iſland of 603,269l. 3 s. 9 d. annual Benefit to our Commerce, and a Burthen but of 20,000 l. to our Revenue, for one which yielded in Trade but 500 l. a Year; and was a dead Weight on the national Fund of above 74,000 l. at the loweſt. This is the true State of *Guadaloupe*, conſidered as an Equivalent for *Minorca*; and the Publick is left to judge how far our commercial Intereſt was conſulted, when one

|| *Vide* Int. Page 49. "*I have before ſaid I do not deny* "*the Utility of the Conqueſt, or even of our future Poſſeſſion* "*of* Guadaloupe, *if not bought too dear.---The Trade of the* "Weſt-Indies *is one of our moſt valuable Trades; our Poſ-* "*ſeſſions there deſerve our greateſt Care and Attention.*"

one was to be given in Exchange for the other.

I come now to consider, not only whether this particular Object, *Minorca*, but whether all the Acquisitions, which we were to have made by that Treaty, put together, can be considered as a just Equivalent for the Loss we should have sustained in the Surrender of *Guadaloupe*.

These Acquisitions then were *Minorca*, *Canada*, and *Senegal*, together with the Isle of *Goree*.

The neutral Islands, *Dominique* and *Tobago*, cannot, as I have shewn, in common Sense be reckoned as Acquisitions made by that Treaty; for we yielded in their Place to *France* two others, *St. Lucie*, alone of infinitely more Consequence, and *St. Vincent:* These in their Place I shall consider more at large: At present I shall examine the Value of all the allowed Acquisitions.

Of *Minorca* I have already spoken, and the Enumeration of its commercial Advantages was quickly finished.

I shall now examine the Weight of *Canada* in the commercial Scale. To avoid incumbering the Discourse, I have thrown the Detail of the exported Produce of *Canada* into a Table. The Sum-total of the Export of *Canada* to *Great Britain* appears to consist principally

principally of Furs and Skins, and to be no more in Value than 14015 l. 17 s. 1 d. a Year.*

* An Account of the Quantities and different Species of Goods imported into *England* from *Canada* from *Chriſtmas* 1760 to *Chriſtmas* 1761.

Quantities			Amount of the Value *l.*	*s.*	*d.*
46 tons 1 ct. 4 lb.	Braſs wrought		162	0	0
437 lb.	Adianthum Nigrum	Drugs.	32	15	6
59 lb.	Balſam Natural	Drugs.	36	17	6
398 lb.	Caſtoreum	Drugs.	99	10	0
15 tons 6 ct. 3 lb.	Iron Buſhell or Caſt		38	5	1
120 ct.	Hoops		18	0	0
180 tons 1 hd. 19 g	Oil Train		2163	18	0
2,820 N°	Bear Black	Skins.	916	10	0
39,732 N°	Beaver	Skins.	6953	2	0
2,624 N°	Buck or Deer in Hair	Skins.	426	8	0
22 N°	Callabar	Skins.	0	3	8
2,169 N°	Catt	Skins.	18	1	6
14,801 N°	Deer *India* ½ dreſt	Skins.	925	1	3
625 N°	Elk	Skins.	203	2	6
513 N°	Fiſher	Skins.	14	19	3
1,458 N°	Fox Ordinary	Skins.	91	2	6
13,565 N°	Martin	Skins.	452	3	4
223 N°	Martron	Skins.	7	8	8
358 N°	Mink	Skins.	34	3	10
1 N°	Mooſe	Skins.	0	2	9
7,220 N°	Muſquaſh	Skins.	180	10	0
2,972 N°	Otter	Skins.	520	3	0
18,112 N°	Raccoon	Skins.	452	16	0
670 N°	Seal	Skins.	30	14	2
503 N°	Wolf	Skins.	125	15	0
146 N°	Wolvering	Skins.	58	8	0
25 lb.	Snuff		2	3	9
98 gal.	Spirits Rum		8	3	4
3 lb.	Whalefins	At Value.	6	0	0
10 l.	A Clock	At Value.	10	0	0
10l. 11s. 6d.	Goods ſeveral Sorts	At Value.	10	11	6
122 lb.	Skins Beaver cutt	At Value.	16	5	0
48 ells.	Sails Foreign made		0	12	0
			14,015	17	1

The Reader, habituated to the Declamations with which the Publick have been ſo often amuſed on the Subject of *Canada*, will undoubtedly be ſomewhat ſurprized at the inconſiderable Value of this immenſely extenſive Country; I believe that thoſe Traders who, deluded by the popular Cry in favour of *Canada*, ventured to ſend ſome Cargoes thither, have had reaſon heartily to repent their Credulity. For my Part I never entertained a very high Opinion of its Importance in any, much leſs in a trading, Light. Yet the preciſe State of its Commerce has fallen below my own mean Opinion of its Value; it is even below the Income of very many private Eſtates: And here let it be remembered, that this Deficiency, in the direct Trade between *Canada* and *Great Britain*, is not compenſated, as in our old northern Colonies, by an extenſive Traffick to the *Weſt-Indies*. The Trade between *Canada* and the Iſlands is abſolutely none; and it has happened exactly as I at firſt foreſaw, that whatever little Trade of this Kind was carried on whilſt *Canada* continued in the Poſſeſſion of *France*, muſt be loſt and at an end, as ſoon as ever *Canada* became an *Engliſh* Poſſeſſion. The entire Produce of this Province might be imported hither in one ſingle Ship; and this is the whole exiſting Value of *Canada* to the Commerce and Navigation of *Great Britain*. 14,000 l. to the former; a Ship or two at moſt to the latter.

The laſt of the Acquiſitions, which we were

to

to have made by that Treaty, was *Senegal* and *Goree*. Properly ſpeaking theſe Settlements are not to be conſidered as Acquiſitions by *Conqueſt*, but by Purchaſe. We did not retain them under the *uti poſſidetis*; but we were to have acquired them by the Ceſſion on our Part of ſome other Places, on the Coaſt of *Africa*: But let them ſtand as real Conqueſts, and let us conſider their Importance. The Value of *Senegal* and *Goree* ariſes principally from their ſupplying us with Gums, which we were before obliged to take from the *French*. By this Acquiſition we alſo add ſomething to our Supply of Slaves. It may, however, be obſerved, that *Senegal* does not ſupply very many Slaves; and that thoſe brought from thence are, of all the *Africans*, the leaſt adapted to Labour, and conſequently bear the loweſt Price at the *Weſt-India* Markets.

It is not in my Power to be quite as exact as I could wiſh in this Particular; however, I have not neglected to acquire the beſt Information poſſible. None of my Accounts raiſe the Number of Slaves, exported from *Senegal* in any Year, to more than 1000; and at the beſt Price their Value at Market will not exceed 30,000 l. The Gum, we receive annually from *Senegal*, may be worth about 7000 l.

The following Table, therefore, will ſhew in one View the Value of the Acquiſitions we were to have made by that Treaty, and the Price we were to have paid for them; and whether all theſe Acquiſitions put together, could be

conſidered as an Equivalent for the Loſs we ſhould have ſuſtained in the Surrender of *Guadaloupe*. By the late Treaty

We ſhould have acquired	l.	s.	d.	We ſhould have loſt	l.	s.	d.
Canada, worth annually	14,015	17	1	*Guadaloupe*, worth annually	603,269	3	9
Minorca, ditto,	500						
Senegal and *Goree*	37,000						
Total Acquiſition *per Ann.*	51,515	17	1				
Net Loſs *per Ann.*	551,753	6	8				
	603,269	3	9		603,269	3	9

Commercially therefore we ſhould have loſt by the Bargain above 550,000 l. a Year, and have purchaſed what we retained at more than ten times their Value.

But if we take into the Conſideration the Expence of keeping theſe Acquiſitions reſpectively, the Account will then ſtand thus:

	£.
In * *Canada* one Regiment	20,000
In *Senegal* and *Goree* one	20,000
In *Minorca* four Regiments	74,000
	114,000

To this Charge, if we oppoſe even the whole groſs Value of the Trade of all theſe Places, there will be found an Over-ballance of Expence more than Profit to the Amount, in time of profoundeſt Peace, of 62,484l. 2s. 11d. whereas,

* I believe the Reader will ſee that I ſtated this Account moſt exceſſively in Favour of *Canada*, by only charging *Canada* with the ſame Force I did to *Guadaloupe*.

whereas, allowing the ſame Force to be kept up in *Guadaloupe* as I have allowed for *Canada*, and deducting accordingly 20,000 l. from the Value of the Produce of that Iſland, there will be ſtill a Ballance in Favour of *Guadaloupe* of 583,269 l. 3 s. 9 d.

So that, on making the beſt of the Bargain, we muſt loſe conſiderably by retaining all the Territories we were to have acquired by that Treaty. The only Object by which we did, or in the Nature of Things we could, gain any thing, we thought proper to give away without any Compenſation at all.

Were we to conſume at Home the whole Produce of *Guadaloupe*, the very Duties raiſed on that Produce would amount to more than the whole groſs Produce of all the reſt of the Acquiſitions which we were to have made by that Treaty.

But the Fact is, that the whole, except the Cotton, is exported, and the Cotton is employed in our Manufactures; the reſt of the Produce, which I ſay is exported, is conſequently to be placed on the Credit Side of the Account of our foreign Trade.

I imagine ſome melancholy Reflections muſt ariſe in the Mind of every Perſon the leaſt intelligent in, or concerned for, the Intereſt of his Country, when he conſiders the immenſe humiliating Reverſe of Fortune, which a few Days would have made in the Affairs of *Great Britain* and *France*, if Peace had been concluded on thoſe Terms. *France* would have got rid of a Territory, which

ſhe

ſhe could neither keep without Expence, nor enlarge without Danger, and ſhe would in return at the ſame Time have re-entered into Poſſeſſion of a moſt extenſive and flouriſhing Trade, worth at leaſt three Millions annually, now either poſſeſſed by us, or uſeleſs to her, by which ſhe would have been enabled in a ſhort Time to repair the Breaches of this War, to pay her Debts, to enlarge her Reſources, and to breed up a Number of Seamen for the Re-eſtabliſhment of her Navy: Whilſt the *Engliſh*, giving a great Part of this very Trade out of their Hands, and incumbered with a Debt of a great deal above 100 Millions, acquired only a barren Expence of 62,484 l. a Year, without one ſingle, even poſſible, Advantage to our Commerce; without any other Conſolation than the Liberty of parading in boundleſs and fruitleſs Foreſts, and amuſing ourſelves with idle Speculations upon the Importance of *Canada*.

I have not valued the two neutral Iſlands, which were to have been left us, in this Eſtimate. In common Senſe they cannot be conſidered as Acquiſitions, unleſs you ſay you acquire when you give away; however, I think it neither wholly unneceſſary to my Purpoſe, nor altogether uſeleſs to the Reader, to enter a little into a Detail of the Value of theſe Iſlands. In order more fully to diſplay the Fallacy and Unfairneſs of the *French* Proceeding in the late Negotiation, when they preſumed to call any Diviſion of thoſe Iſlands, equitable, while they inſiſted upon retaining *St. Lucie*.

Of

Of theſe, called neutral Iſlands, *Tobago*, the moſt Southward, is abſolutely wild, covered with Woods, inhabited only by a few *Caraibs*.

St. Vincent is neither ſo ſmall, nor ſo covered with Woods; nor is it thinly inhabited; but mark well what the Inhabitants are: They are firſt *Caraibs*, to the Number of about 7000; and next, free Negroes, to the Number of about 8000: Theſe two people are free, and both remarkably jealous of their Freedom.

The *French* imagine themſelves, and poſſibly not altogether without Reaſon, better adapted than we are to maintain a friendly Correſpondence with Savages. They have not, however, notwithſtanding this Advantage, ever ventured one ſingle Sugar Eſtabliſhment in this Iſland; and indeed thoſe, who are acquainted with the Nature of ſuch Eſtabliſhments, know how totally oppoſite ſuch a Neighbourhood is to the Exiſtence of a Sugar Settlement, which is not like a landed Eſtate at Home. Its Value does not conſiſt in the Land, but in the Number and Goodneſs of the Slaves, in the Strength and Convenience of the Mills, and other Buildings; all very expenſive in the Conſtruction, and which notwithſtanding may be all deſtroyed, and the Slaves cut off or carried away, in a ſingle Night, by any ſudden Incurſion. A Man has not his Eſtate impaired and damaged, but actually annihilated. No Sugar Colony ever yet flouriſhed, which was not cleared of the *Caraibs*; ſo that you muſt either have purſued the deteſtable

and dangerous Policy of extirpating the old Inhabitants, or have received a mere nominal Poſſeſſion, without any Advantage from *St. Vincent*.

But it was, in Reality, a Matter of great Indifference to the *French*, which of the other neutral Iſlands you choſe, or if you choſe all the other three, if you left them *St. Lucie*.

They were well aware of the real intrinſic Value of this Iſland, and of the real Inſignificance of all the reſt. This Iſland contains about one thouſand Men capable of bearing Arms; they grow a great Quantity of Cotton; the Land in general is extremely good. No Iſland in the *Weſt-Indies* has a better Harbour, nor a greater Plenty of Rivers; add to this, that its Situation made it of ineſtimable Value to *France*, becauſe in time of War it forms a Sort of Barrier to *Martinique*, at leaſt in our Hands it would be the Door to open our Way to *Martinique*; it lies juſt to the Windward of, and not ſeven Leagues diſtant from, *Martinique*.

If our Object was to have kept from the *French* an Iſland, by its Situation of Conſequence to them, St. *Lucie* of all the neutral Iſlands was the one not to be allowed to *France*; and if it was our Object to acquire an Iſland by its Commerce or Situation of Conſequence to us, we ſhould never have thought of *Dominique*; this Iſland, the laſt of the four neutral ones, has more *Caraibs*, and is little more cleared, than *Tobago* itſelf; but even, if its intrinſic Value had been worth Attention, its Situation between the two great Iſlands of *Guadaloupe* and *Martinique*, would render it, whilſt both

both theſe great Iſlands were in the Hands of *France*, of no poſſible Advantage or Service to us. The Moment a War ſhould be proclaimed, not a ſingle Ship could attempt to go into, or ſail out of *Dominique*, without falling into the Hands of the *French*. *Martinique* lies exactly in the Way to intercept every thing going from *Europe* to *Dominique*, as *Guadaloupe* does for intercepting every thing coming out of *Dominique* to *Europe*; if indeed *Guadaloupe* remained to us, that Circumſtance would give ſome Importance to *Dominique*, which lying to the Windward of *Guadaloupe*, as St. *Lucie* lies to *Martinique*, might, if we could forget the Difference of intrinſic Value, be of the ſame Service in covering our Poſſeſſions; but if *Guadaloupe* is given up, I do inſiſt upon it, that not one, no, nor all of the other neutral Iſlands are worth our taking, except *St. Lucie*; and if *St. Lucie* was of ſuch Importance to *France*, that ſhe could not part with it, ſhe could not have refuſed paying well for it; and therefore muſt it not aſtoniſh the Reader to find, that, when we generouſly made ſo great, ſo important a Conceſſion, to which on the Terms of an equal Partition, ſhe was no way intitled, we did not take that favourable Opportunity of working on the Gratitude of the *French*, ſince we could not on their Juſtice, to beſeech them not to dictate to us too like Conquerors; to tell them, that, if *St. Lucie* was neceſſary to cover their great Iſland of *Martinique*; *Guadaloupe*, even in that Idea, was full as neceſſary to

cover our || *Leward* Iſlands; that they had not more Right to one, than we had to the other. If this Reaſoning did not prevail, might we not have imitated their own Language concerning *Belleiſle?* If you think the neutral Iſlands of ſuch real Value, you are free to keep them, and we will content ourſelves with *Guadaloupe*. Ought we not to have made a Bargain, ſince we could not make an Acquiſition? if we were not to take Advantage of our Conqueſts, we ought, methinks, to have made ſome Advantage of our Conceſſions.

If we miſs this critical Moment, and ſhould one Day find ourſelves to have been miſtaken in our Ideas of the *Weſt-Indies*; our Miſtake in all human Probability will be for ever irretrievable. The *French*, who truſted too much in the natural Strength of their Iſlands, and were lulled into Security by the idle Boaſt of their Planters, had not during this War either in *Martinico* or *Guadaloupe*, a regular Force of one thouſand Men. They now ſee their Error, and cannot in a future War omit to correct it; and then they may perhaps find Means

|| *Guadaloupe* lies to the Leward of *Antigua*, *Nevis*, *Monſerrat*, *St. Kits*, and all that Cluſter of ſmall *Engliſh* Iſlands, and conſequently thoſe Iſlands are moſt liable to be attacked from thence, if it returns to *France*, and this Iſland is moſt capable of protecting them if it remains in our Hands. It is certainly very extraordinary that all ſhould be ſacrificed to the Idea of Security, in *North America*, where we were infinitely ſtronger than the *French*, and that no Notion of Danger ſhould be entertained for our valuable Poſſeſſions in the *Weſt-Indies*, where we are infinitely weaker than the *French*.

Means to make a better Defence in their connected Iſlands, two of them larger each than all our *Leward* Iſlands put together, than we may be able to do in our ſmall, diſperſed, Scraps of defenceleſs Land. In Reality, the *French* Poſſeſſions, in that Part of *America*, ſeem to be the Reſult of Deliberation and Syſtem, and to have been formed by a People, who had both a full Freedom of Choice, and Power to enforce it; our Poſſeſſions, on the contrary, are irregular, unconnected, and ſeem to have been occupied as derelict, or as ſtolen; and not as Choice pointed out, but as Occaſion and Neceſſity would admit.

I have, I hope, fully demonſtrated, that the Acquiſition of *Guadaloupe* alone is not only ſuperior to that of *Minorca*, which alone was put into the Scale againſt it, but far ſuperior in Value to every thing elſe united, which we ſhould have acquired by that Treaty, upon any of thoſe Plans the Enemy propoſed, or even upon thoſe, which we drew up *agreeably to our own Deſires*.

I ſhall now, conformably to the Plan I preſcribed to myſelf at firſt ſetting out, endeavour to aſcertain, and to obſerve upon, the Cauſes that may have induced us to overlook the glaring Advantages, which reſulted from our Poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe*, and to enter into a Barter ſo ſtrangely diſproportionate, as that of *Guadaloupe* for *Minorca*.

I muſt previouſly obſerve, that no Man can have a Diſpoſition more remote from the Deſire of intermixing any thing perſonal in

this Diſcuſſion. No Man has a more ſincere Veneration for the Dignity, or greater Reſpect for the Abilities, of the Perſons, who were ſuppoſed to have been concerned in that Negotiation; but it will be eaſily allowed, that the moſt extenſive Mind, occupied with a Variety of great Objects, may poſſibly overlook ſome minute Details. To blame for not being attentive to every thing, is not to accuſe any particular Man, but human Nature itſelf. The moſt important Conſequences, however, may ſometimes depend upon ſuch Details, and it may be lawful to rectify, where it would be criminal to reproach. The Truth is, that neither the whole, nor any Part, of the Adminiſtration is juſtly culpable for this Miſtake; thoſe Perſons alone are to blame, who, for Reaſons beſt known to themſelves, by inflammatory Declamations, by idle Suggeſtions of Danger, and by Suggeſtions of Profit ſtill more frivolous, turned the Eyes and Thoughts of the Publick from their true Intereſt; thoſe Men, therefore, and thoſe alone, are reſponſible to their Country, and to their Conſcience, for obtruding on the Publick a Syſtem, which ſome of them might, and others of them muſt have known, to be totally deſtitute of any *one* rational Foundation.

We ought not to forget, who they were that joined this Cry, and ſwelled it into ſuch a tumultuous Loudneſs. Many Perſons, from having been jealous Rivals of, and ſometimes very determined Enemies, to the Proſperity of our *North American* Colonies, all at once fell into the

the moſt affected and ridiculous Solicitude for their Safety; they pretended to think, and had Craft enough to make others really believe, that, whilſt the *French* retained any footing in *Canada*, we could not be for an Hour ſecure of our Northern Settlements; that our People would be in continual Danger of being deſtroyed by inhuman Maſſacres, and their Poſſeſſions of being waſted by Fire and Sword; that, in ſhort, without ſecuring every Part of all *French Canada*, let the Value of our other Acquiſitions be ever ſo great, our *North American* Colonies would tell us, we had done nothing; and with ſuch ſurprizing Induſtry was this abſurd Clamour propagated, that *Canada* came at laſt to take an entire Poſſeſſion of our Hearts and Underſtandings; and we were taught to believe, that no Ceſſion was too great to purchaſe this ineſtimable Security, this immoveable Barrier of all our Colonies; nay, they carried the Point much further, and pretended, that, if we were once in Poſſeſſion of this Territory, we had little elſe to deſire for the future Proſperity both of the Mother Country, and her Colonies.

This very groundleſs Opinion was the true Source of our Neglect, in the late Negotiation, of ſuch real, commercial Advantages, as might augment the Reſources of *Great Britain*. And from hence proceeded that utter Oblivion of all former Maxims of our Policy, whilſt, under the Name of Security, we ſought with Eagerneſs extenſive and unprofitable Empire, and rejected moderate but lucrative Acquiſition. This Error, if it ſhould continue to gain Ground, may prove

prove more detrimental to us, than the Loſs of any particular Object, or, perhaps, than all the Objects of this Negotiation. It may by Degrees infect the whole Syſtem of our national Policy. I hope therefore, that it will not be thought either tedious or impertinent, if I endeavour to unravel the intricate and fraudulent Scheme, by which we were firſt drawn into this Error; and to ſhew, that the firſt-born, the favourite Offspring of this new Syſtem, was of little Value either in itſelf, or for thoſe Purpoſes, for which it was pretended to be ſo neceſſeary.

I do not ſay that *Canada*, which *France* has thrown upon us, ſhould be again thrown back upon her; but we ought not to ſuffer ourſelves to be ſo groſsly deluded on this Subject, as to imagine, that in this Ceſſion ſhe has loſt, or that we have gained any thing ſo eſſential, as ſhould induce us to acquieſce in the Surrender of every other Advantage, or in the Neglect of every other rational Purſuit. The Points, which it was incumbent on the Advocates for *Canada* to have proved, were, I conceive, theſe three.

Firſt, That the Poſſeſſion of *French Canada* was any great Acquiſition to our national Strength, either abſolutely, or in Preference to other Objects.

Secondly, That our Colonies could not have had a rational Security, without the Poſſeſſion of all *Canada*.

Thirdly, That the Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, intire, could give them that kind of Security, for which they deſired it.

I apprehend they have proved none of these three, which are the material, Points; and I hope to shew that they cannot prove them.

I do not know that the able Writer, whose Steps I have hitherto attended, or any other, has made a single direct Assertion in Favour of the commercial Advantages of *Canada*. Indeed the whole Skill and Mastery of those, who managed that Side of the Question, consisted in two Artifices: First, In palpably mis-stating the Question, by supposing that those, who thought other Objects more desirable than *Canada*, were for including, under the Denomination of *Canada*, every thing which lay beyond the Mountains. But the Fact was quite otherwise; that Scheme, which opposed the Necessity of our retaining all *Canada*, proposed our acquiring the whole of *Nova Scotia*, the whole Country to the River *St. Laurence*, and thence all along the Southward of the Lakes, and to the *Mississippi*, or at least to the River *St. Jerome*. These Boundaries, they were of Opinion, gave them an immense Enlargement of Territory; and, indeed, every thing either of Strength or Value in *North America*. Having secured these, they were of Opinion, that, if the *French* should afterwards hold out their contracted and crippled *Canada*, as an Indemnification for any of our valuable Conquests, we ought rather to leave it to them, than to make so disadvantageous a Change. This was the real Scheme proposed, and that which they, who wanted to confine our whole Attention to *Canada*, ought to have opposed; but they

they oppoſed a Phantom of their own raiſing, and argued as if there was no Medium between not acquiring *Canada*, and acquiring nothing. As they contracted, in this confuſed Way of ſpeaking, the Ideas of their Adverſaries, ſo by the ſame Confuſion they enlarged their own; and conſequently argued as if the Acquiſition of *Canada*, and of all *North America*, was one and the ſame thing: This was the Firſt of their Arts.

The Second was, dwelling, in Seaſon and out of Seaſon, on the general Value of our preſent Commerce with *North America*; and leaving it to the Reader, if he pleaſed, to draw a Concluſion in Favour of further Acquiſitions there; and particularly in Favour of *Canada*, which happens to be in that Part of the World.

But this general and confuſed Method of Reaſoning, ſo favourable to Deceit and Impoſition, muſt alſo be quitted, before we can come to any preciſe and accurate Ideas on this Queſtion.

The general Name of *North America* is apt, and it is ſo intended by the *Panegyriſts* of *Canada*, to miſlead us into an Opinion, that all the Colonies, included in that common Name, partake of the ſame common Circumſtances, and trade with us upon the ſame Terms. Nothing can, however, be more fallacious than this Notion. Our Colonies, on that vaſt Continent, are of two Kinds, and under Circumſtances extremely different from each other; and we can never reaſon concerning them with any

any tolerable Preciſion, without keeping this Diſtinction continually before us. By the Means of this Diſtinction, we may be enabled to acquire ſomewhat juſter Ideas of our Colony Intereſts, than we ſeem to have hitherto entertained; and even, as Matter of Speculation, theſe Enquiries are not wholly unworthy the Regard and Study of every literate *Engliſhman*.

The Colonies to the Northward, on this Continent, are *Nova Scotia*, the four Provinces of *New England*, *New York*, *Penſilvania*, and the two *Jerſeys*. All theſe have very little direct Trade with *Great Britain:* I mean they have nothing, with which they can repay us for the Commodities they draw from hence: They only trade with *England* circuitouſly; either through the *Weſt-Indies*, which is to us the moſt advantageous Part of their Trade; or through foreign *European* Countries, which, however neceſſary, is a dangerous and ſuſpicious Channel. Our *Engliſh* Ships meet theirs with the ſame Commodities, at the ſame Markets; and, if theſe Markets happen to be overſtocked, we interfere with, and conſequently hurt, each other. But what is ſtill more material, there is much Reaſon to ſuſpect, that no ſmall Part of the Benefit of our *North American* Trade is, by this Means, loſt to the Mother Country, and paſſes to Foreigners, and ſometimes to Enemies. Theſe northern Provinces are in Effect not ſubject to the Act of Navigation, or to the other Acts, which have ſince increaſed the Number of enumerated Commoditities, becauſe excepting only ſome Furs,

they do not trade in any ſuch Commodities. They are therefore neither obliged directly to bring their Goods to *England*; nor, when they have carried them to other Countries, are they neceſſitated to take *England* in their Way home. Whereas all the Colonies, which produce any of the enumerated Commodities, under whatever Relaxations, are always ſubject to the one or other of theſe Regulations. For Inſtance, Ships from *Boſton* may carry Fiſh, Corn, and Proviſions, to *France* or *Italy*, and return again directly to *Boſton*, loaden with foreign Commodities, ſubject to no other Check than what muſt be conſidered as none, that of a Cuſtom-houſe Officer in their own Colony.

But the ſouthern Colonies of this ſame Continent, I mean *Virginia*, *Maryland*, the *Carolinas*, and *Georgia*, are under quite different Circumſtances. They produce many Commodities, which are immediately demanded at the *Engliſh* Market, ſuch as Tobacco, Rice, and Indigo; all which, being enumerated in the Act of Navigation, muſt, according to that Act, be brought to the *Engliſh* Market, and to no other. And in the Act, which permits ſome of theſe Commodities to be ſent under ſome Reſtrictions to the Countries South of *Cape Finiſterre*, a Precaution is inſerted, that the Veſſels, concerned in that Trade, muſt take *Great Britain* in their Way home; by which they are effectually prevented from making their Returns, or any Part of them, in foreign Merchandize.

But

But to ſet more clearly before the Reader the Difference between thoſe two kinds of Colonies, I muſt obſerve, that *New England*, the moſt populous of our Settlements, ſent hither in 1761, Commodities to the Value only of 25,985l. 8s. 11d. *New York* only 21,684l. 10s. 3d. and *Penſilvania* only 22,404l. 13s. 11d. But the Moment you paſs this Line, which divides the Colonies to the Southward, the Caſe is at once extremely altered. *Virginia* and *Maryland* exported hither in that Year 357,228l. 7s. 4d. and *Carolina* 206,534l. 2s. 2d. If we look to our two new Colonies, or the two Extremities of that Continent to the North and South, this Difference will in Proportion be full as conſpicuous. *Georgia* exported hither to the Value of 6,074l. 3s. 9d. This is indeed little; but *Nova Scotia*, tho' the Settlement there was planned with the utmoſt Wiſdom, though a Million of Money has been already, within a very few Years, expended upon it, and though that enormous Sum has been applied with the moſt diſtinguiſhed Oeconomy and Management, yet that Settlement has not hitherto been able to return Commodities to more than 18l. 3s. Value *per ann.* for that was the Whole of their laſt Year's Export.

The Southern continental Colonies, in their Commerce with us, bear a much nearer Reſemblance to the *Weſt-Indies*, than to their northern Neighbours; and an Augmentation of Territory, were it at all wanted, as it is not, in that Part of the World, would be there very near as deſireable in a commercial Light,

as an Augmentation in the *Weſt-Indies*. But the Acquiſition of *Canada* is an Acquiſition, not to theſe ſouthern, but to the northern Provinces. From its Climate, it cannot trade with *Great Britain*, but in Furs, of which we have already ſeen the Value, becauſe it can produce no other enumerated Commodity; and from its Situation, it is as nothing in the circuitous Trade with the *Weſt-Indies*, by which our old northern Colonies are chiefly ſupported.

Whatever, therefore, is ſaid, or inſinuated, of the Advantages of *Canada*, by an Inference from the Advantage derived from our *North American* Colonies in general, is altogether groundleſs and fallacious. But to induce us the more eaſily to repoſe all our Deſires, and to caſt all our Cares upon *Canada*, they uſe another Art, which, though in ſtrict Argument it is leſs than nothing, yet to thoſe who propoſe it, ſerves uſeful Purpoſes; it tends to divert our Minds from the true State of the Queſtion; they endeavour therefore to amuſe us with an Expectation, that the vaſt Inland Tracts about the *Ohio*, removed from all maritime Communication by their Diſtance, and by the Interpoſition of great Mountains, may one Day be made greatly ſubſervient to our Commerce by raiſing ſeveral uſeful Commodities, for which we have a Demand in *England*. In this Point, as in all others, relative to this important Queſtion, they play moſt inſufferably upon the ſuppoſed Ignorance, and Credulity, of their Readers.

In the firſt Place, they endeavour to prevail

on

on us to throw away extenſive, exiſting, real, immediate Advantages, in Hopes of thoſe which, even on their own ſtating, are but ſpeculative, remotely future, contingent, and, if at all poſſible, depending upon a thouſand Accidents. They flatter us, for Inſtance, with an Idea, that we ſhall one Time or other be able to raiſe raw Silk, and alſo with Profit to tranſport Hemp from the Heart of that remote Continent; when we know that this Commodity of Hemp in our old Settlements, in Climates full as favourable to its Growth, and in Situations near the Sea, and therefore infinitely more favourable to its Export, never has hitherto been cultivated to any Advantage, but has even reſiſted parliamentary Encouragements and Bounties, almoſt equal to its native Value, in ſuch a Manner, that this Point ſeems at length to be given up by the Legiſlature as in Deſpair, and the Act for granting this ineffectual Bounty has been ſuffered to expire.

To the other Promiſe of raw Silk the ſame Anſwer may be given. When we find our maritime Colonies of *Carolina* and *Georgia*, which extend in Length 500 Miles, and as much in Breadth, which are far more favourable in their Situation, becauſe more ſouthern in their Climate, ſo abounding in this Produce, as not to be able to grow a ſufficient Number of Mulberry Trees for their Worms, then, and not till then, it will be Time for us to think of looking for an Extent of Territory, in order to raiſe raw Silk; I am afraid this is a Speculation for a very late Poſterity indeed.

It is really pleaſant to obſerve an ingenious Theoriſt, ſtraining at the higheſt Pitch of his Erudition to prove, what nobody has ever thought of diſputing with him, that an Inland Commerce has been in former Ages, and is ſtill carried on in many Parts of the World, to Advantage; I ſay it is pleaſant, becauſe he ſeldom thinks fit to mention the Commodities in which this Trade is carried on, nor the Circumſtances of thoſe who manage it; and conſequently leaves us intirely at a Loſs, in what Manner to apply thoſe Facts to the Point in Queſtion. In moſt of the Inſtances which he has produced, ſuch an Explanation would make full againſt him. And, if I were not in Fear that I had already treſpaſſed too much on the Reader's Patience, I could demonſtrate, that Imagination can hardly carry Extremes to a greater Diſtance, than there is between the Examples which this Author produces, and the Objects to which he would apply them. From this Apprehenſion of being too minute, I have here omitted the Argument at large, which originally made a Part of this Diſcourſe, and which may poſſibly appear at ſome other Time, and in a more particular Diſcuſſion concerning the Policy of our Colonies.

But why ſhould we reſort to foreign Countries and remote Times, for Examples, when we have all the proper Means of Information at Home, and as it were immediately under our Eyes? Can it not be proved, that it is by no Means the Extent of our Colonies into the

Inland

Inland Parts, which has cauſed the increaſed Conſumption of our Manufactures in *North America*, but the Increaſe in the maritime Parts, and near the navigable Rivers, the Benefit of which cannot extend very far. Goods produced beyond the Blue Mountains muſt, in their Way to our northern Sea Ports, firſt aſcend the Streams, that fall from the weſtern Sides of theſe Mountains; and then, in deſcending the Streams, which fall from the eaſtern Sides, muſt, from the many Rifts and Falls in thoſe Streams, be ſo often unloaded and reloaded, that we can entertain no Hopes of ſeeing at our Markets any raw heavy Commodities raiſed in thoſe Countries; yet ſuch alone are the Commodities which thoſe Countries could raiſe, or which our Policy would ſuffer to be tranſported from thence to a foreign Market.

Let us not amuſe ourſelves with vain Speculations! As far as the Profits of *Indian* Trade extend, ſo far, and no further, the Tramontine Coloniſt may deal with us. When this Fund is exhauſted, they can no longer be uſeful to us; they muſt manufacture for themſelves, or they muſt degenerate into Savages. The Surplus of a rude new Agriculture, to be tranſported under every poſſible Diſadvantage, can be no Ballance for Manufactures which have had the laſt Hand, and are to be ſent to them under all the ſame Diſadvantages.

The Author of the *Intereſt* may have heard ſomething of the State of the Settlers, eſpecially the back Settlers in *Penſylvania*. "*They*

"*manufacture*,

"*manufacture, says** Douglas, *perhaps nine Parts* "*in ten of all they wear.*" They make Linen even for Exportation. The moſtdiſtant of thoſe People live at no very great Diſtance from the Sea, they are extremely induſtrious and frugal; and yet, with all their Agriculture and Manufacture, and with all their Frugality and Induſtry, they are none of them in a very opulent Condition. They are indeed far from culpable; it is their Situation alone that is to be blamed. But were we willing to admit all, and more than he urges in Favour of this hypothetical inland Commerce, in the Name of Heaven what Argument does this furniſh for the Neceſſity of keeping *Canada?* Theſe *Ohio* Countries never compoſed any Part of *Canada*; nor was any Part of *Nova Scotia* included in it. Is it for want of Territory that he is pleaſed to claim *Canada?* Our old Poſſeſſions, and our recovered Rights in *North America*, contain Land for raiſing Hemp and raw Silk ſufficient, not only for our own Market, but equal to what is exported in the Courſe of Trade from and to all the Parts of the known World. Theſe old Poſſeſſions and recovered Rights, independent of *Canada*, contain a Territory, extending on the Coaſt upwards of 1500 Miles in Length, and in many Places 600 within Land. A Territory as large as *France*, *Spain* and *Germany* taken together, and much more than

* Vid. Douglas's North America, pag. 332. vol. ii, N.B. This is a *North American* Writer.

than ſufficient for the Support of at leaſt thirty Millions of Inhabitants, poſſibly as many Subjects as our Prudence ought to deſire, becauſe they are as many as our Strength will enable us to govern. Notwithſtanding this immenſe Extent of Territory, to hear this Writer, one would imagine, we were confined to ſome pitiful Rock of a few Acres, and ſtifled for want of Elbow Room:

Æſtuat infelix anguſto limite Mundi,
Ut Gyari clauſus ſcopulis, parvaque Seripho.

To conclude this Point, I think three Things very evident; firſt, that Inland Colonies can never prove in any conſiderable Degree beneficial to our Commerce; ſecondly, that, independent of *Canada*, we have Land more than ſufficient for every Sort of Product, which the moſt ſanguine Schemiſt can imagine; and laſtly, that if we were deficient in Extent of Territory, yet *Canada* proper lies in a Climate abſolutely incapable of furniſhing any one of the Commodities they pretend to raiſe. And juſt to add a Word further, let the Reader recollect that, allowing all they ſay to be probable, it is built on Ideas merely ſpeculative, and not ſupported by a ſingle exiſting Fact.

I paſs then from the Conſideration of *Canada* as an Eſtabliſhment of Profit, to conſider its Value as an Eſtabliſhment of Defence; for this Writer does not ſpeak of *Canada* ſo much as an uſeful Acquiſition, as an Acquiſition abſolutely neceſſary; he does not ſay that without this Country we ſhould have a weaker Security, but that without it, our Colonies

can have no Security at all. This Propoſition he is pleaſed to aſſert in all the wild Latitude of the Writer whoſe Advocate he is. Let us ſee how he ſupports it.

In order to ſhew, that nothing leſs than the intire Poſſeſſion of *Canada* could provide for the Security of our Colonies in *North America*, it was neceſſary he ſhould have firſt ſhewn that they were in Danger, becauſe the Extent and Nature of the Security muſt always depend on the Nature and Extent of the Danger.

This Point, one would think, in every Argument, which but pretended to Regularity, ſhould have been firſt ſolidly eſtabliſhed; ſo far were they however from producing a Danger ſufficient to juſtify this extravagant Alarm which they had raiſed, that the Author of the *Intereſt* opens his Cauſe by admitting, that in Fact we are not expoſed to any Danger of Moment; becauſe he confeſſes that * "in *North* "*America* we are a far greater continental "as well as naval Power than *France*; and "that only Cowardice or Ignorance can ſubject "our Colonies there to a *French* Conqueſt."

On what Ground therefore does he build his Syſtem of the abſolute indiſpenſible Neceſſity of this Acquiſition of all *Canada?* Why, upon a Diſtinction! he diſtinguiſhes Security, and conſequently Danger, into three Kinds; the firſt Security is that from Conqueſt, from all Apprehenſions of which you ſee he is pleaſed to relieve us; the ſecond Security is that from Moleſtation by

* Vid. Int. Col. Pag. 16.

by Savages; the third is a Security from another *American* War.

The ſecond Point is that which he principally labours. He obſerves, and very juſtly, that the *American* Savages make War not like Armies, but like Robbers; that Forts are no more Security againſt their Incurſions, than the † Tower of *London* is againſt Highwaymen, and that they will be incited to theſe Incurſions, and conſequently that our Colonies cannot have this Security, as long as the *French* have any footing in *North America*.

But notwithſtanding the important, and terrible Light, in which theſe ſcattered Gangs of Robbers are repreſented by ſome of our political Writers, the beſt informed amongſt theſe Writers, as well as the loudeſt on this very Topic, has been pleaſed to furniſh us with ſuch Facts, as prove demonſtrably that the *Indians* have never been able materially to check the Population, or to impair the Commerce, of our moſt expoſed Colonies. For he has ſhewn that the People of theſe Colonies, independent of foreign Recruits, double themſelves in twenty-five Years. The moſt undiſturbed Tranquility could not have been productive of a greater Population; and I much doubt whether we have an Example of any thing like it in any other Part of the Globe.

† Int. Col. p. 12. "*Long Experience has taught our* "*Planters that they cannot rely on Forts as Security againſt* "Indians. *The Inhabitans of* Hackney *might as well rely* "*upon the Tower of* London *to ſecure them againſt Highway-* "*men and Houſe-breakers.*"

This he has ſhewn to be the State of Population in the Colonies before the War, and he has not told us that it has ſuffered any conſiderable Alteration ſince. On this Point he gives us nothing particular. But, to make amends, he has ſhewn that with regard to their Trade, the ſavage War, far from having put them back, has not been able to keep them at a Stand, or to prevent their advancing to a very ſudden, and very extraordinary Pitch of Proſperity. He has ſhewn that theſe Colonies from the Year 1755 to the Year 1758, (the very Period of theſe ſavage Incurſions) have increaſed in their Import Trade much more than in any three Years of the profoundeſt Peace; nor has their Export leſſened, it has rather improved.

Theſe Facts prove beyond all Contradiction, either that theſe remote back Settlements ſuffered very little in the War, or that their Suffering can very little affect the commercial Proſperity of our continental Colonies. I do not by any means attribute this Proſperity to that Suffering. It is clear that this Augmentation of their Trade is ſolely owing to the War, the moſt lucrative Event that ever happened to *America*. In the laſt Year 500,000 *l.* in Specie was remitted to *North America*, for extraordinary Services. But it is equally clear, that the Deſtruction of the back Settlements has not been able to prevent the War from operating moſt amazingly in their Favour; and whatever may be ſaid of the *Indian* Cruelties, (and

* Vid. Inter. Pag. 35.

(and they are certainly terrible) if we ſet the Advantages of their Trade in Peace, againſt their Cruelties in Time of War, it will be found that this People have on the whole rather contributed to extend our Settlements into the remote Countries, than to reſtrain them; and I can ſcarce conceive, ſuppoſing it a Matter of more Conſideration to us than it is, how our Colonies in this Time could, if no ſuch People had exiſted, have extended themſelves much beyond their preſent Limits, the maritime Parts being naturally firſt peopled.

I ſhall however permit theſe Gentlemen to lay what Weight they will upon this Danger; and even contrary to Truth, ſuppoſe the Danger not to be reciprocal to us and to the *French*. But then it becomes incumbent on them to ſhew, that, by their Scheme of poſſeſſing all *Canada*, they will provide the neceſſary Security they have always contended for. On this, which is the Affirmative, the material, Part of the Queſtion, and the true Point of the Argument, they have abſolutely quitted the Field, after having advanced no further than, and indeed ſcarce ſo far as to, a naked Aſſertion.

They advanced no further, however ſurpriſing it may ſeem, for a very good Reaſon. They ſaw plainly enough that, if the greateſt and moſt decided Superiority could be conſidered as a Security, we had that Security even before

before the War †; they saw that, by the Esta blishment of our just Limits in *Nova Scotia*, on the *Ohio*, and the Lakes, without at all including *French Canada*, that Security would have been at least doubled; and that we should have been put into Possession of every strong and important Pass in *North America*. They saw all this, and were sensible, at the same time, that, in order to prove the Necessity, of acquiring *Canada*, they had been obliged to lay down a Principle of Security, to which the Acquisition of *Canada* would be full as inadequate as the very System they condemned: their Principle was, that whilst the *French* bordered on us in any Part, we could enjoy no Security. Had they attempted therefore to shew the Affirmative Part, that *Canada* was an effectual Provision against this Danger, they knew they must resort to those very Arguments, which they had all along opposed, and that the Weakness of their Scheme would appear at the very first Glance, unless they could prove that *Canada* was all *North America*, for on no other Supposition was *their Security* to be had. They therefore thought it safer intirely to evade this Discussion, though they had been expressly challenged to it; hoping that the Publick would take it for granted, that

†The strange Positions, advanced on this matter, render it necessary to remind the Reader that it was not the *Danger* of our Colonies, but the Encroachments on our Rights which occasioned the War. Rights, which however remote or inconsiderable, it would not have suited the Dignity of our Crown tamely to have seen invaded; but no publick Act mentioned, and no private Man of Sense ever thought of Danger.

that thoſe, who had ſhewed themſelves ſo extremely alarmed at the Danger of the Colonies as to forget every other Conſideration, had been wiſe enough to provide effectually for their Security. No Perſon living having therefore ſaid a ſingle Word in Proof of this Propoſition, that *Canada* really gave the Security they required; and it being, I am very ſure, far enough from ſelf-evident, I might be ſuppoſed exempted from the Trouble of a Refutation. But in order to give an intire Satisfaction to the Reader, I ſhall intreat his Patience a little longer on this Point.

The great Streſs of the Argument is laid, as he will obſerve, upon our Danger from the ſavage * Incurſions, and here it is proper that thoſe, who have not very attentively ſtudied the Affairs of *America*, ſhould be appriſed, that our Colonies in common with the Colonies of all other *European* Nations, thoſe of *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *Holland*, have from their firſt Settlement been liable to ſome Moleſtation from the aboriginal Savages of that Country. This is an Inconvenience to which ſuch Colonies are, and ever muſt in ſome Degree be ſubject, as long as thoſe ſavage Nations continue to exiſt; and no Meaſures whatever can effectually remove it.

But if it is proper that this Inconvenience ſhould be fairly laid before the Reader, it is no leſs proper that he ſhould be informed of other Particulars equally true; firſt, that the Danger to us from theſe Incurſions is by no Means

* Vid. Int. Col. p. 5. et paſſim.

Means ſo great as theſe Writers affect to repreſent; nor have the *French Indians* been uniformly noxious to us and uſeful to the *French*. On the contrary, we have ſometimes made theſe very Savages extremely uſeful to us againſt the *French*; and we have more than once, by means of theſe very Savages, brought the *French* Colony of *Canada* to the very Brink of Deſtruction. And, Secondly, That be the Danger of what Magnitude they pleaſe, they have never ſhewn that *Canada* will prove any ſort of Security againſt the Danger from the *Indians*.

With regard to the firſt Point, ſome peculiar and ſtriking Manners, an odd and ſingular Mode of Expreſſion in their Harangues, ſome horrid Cruelties in their Way of making War, have rendered the Affairs of thoſe People more affecting to us, than their real Importance in the *American* Syſtem at all deſerves. The ſavage Manners ſtrike powerfully on the Imagination, and are therefore an excellent Inſtrument in the Hands of deſigning People. I know that the unhappy Sufferers by the *Indian* Barbarity are worthy of great Compaſſion; but I know too, that this Compaſſion ought not to pervert our Judgment, or alarm us out of all common Senſe and all rational Conſideration of our Intereſt. Notwithſtanding the tremendous Accounts which have from Time to Time filled our News Papers, on the beſt Information I have been able to derive from a very diligent Enquiry, the Damage done in *North America*, in compariſon of the Terror it

has occaſioned, has been altogether trifling. An *Indian* Enemy, the Novelty once removed, is as contemptible for his Weakneſs as he is odious for his Cruelty; and it might be eaſily proved, that all the People killed from one End of *America* to the other, in theſe ſavage Excurſions, before the current Year, did not amount to the Number ſlain in one ſharp Skirmiſh in *Germany*; ſuch a Skirmiſh as for the Loſs of it they would have ſhewn no kind of publick Concern here at *London*, or for the Advantage in which we ſhould not light a ſingle Window.

But this ſo dreaded Race of Men, to the Conſideration of whom we are to poſtpone all our other Intereſt, are not only extremely divided, and many of them actually fighting for us, but they are even now only few in Number. Our Traders wage a moſt deſtructive and uninterrupted War on them in the Commerce of Spirituous Liquors, by which they ſeverely retaliate all the Murder which the Barbarity of the Savages inſtigates them to commit. Thus by their Vices, their Ignorance, their inconvenient Manner of Life, and their Cruelty, which is not executed ſolely upon their *European* Neighbours, they are ſo extremely reduced and decay ſo prodigiouſly (I had almoſt ſaid incredibly) faſt, that it is probable in half a Century they muſt diſappear from the Neighbourhood of our Colonies. Truely it is curious enough to obſerve, that when theſe People were ten times more numerous than they are at preſent, and in every Reſpect more terrible, the Inhabitants of our Colonies,

at that Time comparatively very few, always ſpoke and wrote of them, with the greateſt Contempt ; and now, when the *Indians* as well as the *French* are greatly reduced, when the very Country, which ſome of the moſt dreaded of thoſe Nations inhabit, was, on the Terms of our original Right, to be put into our Hands to fortify as we pleaſed, then all of a ſudden the Colonies are repreſented as in the utmoſt Terror and Conſternation. Then they are expoſed to Burnings, Waſtings, and Murders of Men, Women, and Children, and we have done abſolutely nothing for them while the *French* poſſeſs *Canada*.

I am, however, willing, for Argument, to admit the Power of theſe pitiful Savages to be as great as the Gentlemen pleaſe ; to allow, that, in ſpite of our ſtrong Eſtabliſhment in their Country, they will continually and unanimouſly perſevere in the *French* Intereſt. I will ſuppoſe that they have ſo little of Wiſdom or of human Nature, that they will pertinaciouſly court an unfortunate and ruinous Alliance. Yet if the Plan propoſed by theſe Gentlemen will deliver them from the Fear which they pretend; if their Demands, extenſive as they are, will come up in any Degree to their Principles ; I am very ready at once to adopt their Scheme. On this Point, I am willing to join Iſſue, and here to reſt the whole Controverſy.

And firſt, I muſt obſerve, that the ingenious Author of the *Intereſt* has no where attempted to prove, that, in Caſe the *French* were wholly removed not only out of *Canada*, but out of the World ; we ſhould be thereby

thereby ſecured from the Ravages and Incurſions of the *Indians*. He knows too well that theſe People have many Motives and Inducements to War, independent of the Influence of *French* Politicks; and he is too well verſed in our Colony Hiſtory, not to remember that we have been engaged in many of our greateſt *Indian* Wars, at Times when we had no Reaſon to ſuſpect, that the *Indian* Hoſtilities were at all provoked by *French* Councils.

This Writer is ſo fully ſatisfied of the Inſufficiency of the Ceſſion of *Canada* to guard againſt the only Danger he is pleaſed to alledge, that he is obliged to fly to that very Security, the abſolute Inſufficiency of which he had before ſo poſitively, and, indeed, ſo very juſtly aſſerted; and he contends that we muſt even maintain *Forts and Garriſons to awe the *Indians*, though *Canada* ſhould be yielded to us.

I would beſeech thoſe, who take Pains to exaggerate Diſorders which they know to be incurable, with intent to recommend political Noſtrums which they know to be inſufficient, to recollect, that whenever *Canada* becomes a *Britiſh* Colony, it becomes from that Moment intitled to our Care and Protection, as much as any other of our Settlements; to recollect that the remote *Engliſh* Settlers in our Colony of *Canada*, will alſo be expoſed as much or more than any of the reſt, on its immenſely extended Frontier, to the Attacks of hundreds of ſavage Nations, to very many of which we have

* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 13. "*I would not be underſtood to deny* "*that, if we retain* Canada, *ſome few Forts will be of uſe.*"

been hitherto Strangers, and againſt which this Country of *Canada*, when it was in the Hands of *France*, was ſome ſort of Outwork to us. Some of theſe Nations may probably be under the Influence of the *French*, ſome under that of the *Spaniards*, others under an Influence perhaps ſtill more dangerous, their own particular Ambition, their own Reſentment, or their own ſavage Caprice. So that the boaſted Remedy has only ſhifted the Seat, and by no Means removed the Cauſe, of the Diſtemper.

Beſides, let us not forget, that a great Part of our old Colonies, a great Part of *Virginia*, the two *Carolinas*, and *Georgia*, are in themſelves much the weakeſt, and much the moſt valuable, of all our Colonies on that Continent, and are bordered by much the ſtrongeſt of the ſavage Tribes; the ten Nations on the *Ohio*, thoſe of the *Creeks*, and the *Cherokees*, *Chicaſaws*, *Chactaws*, whom we know to have been not at all intimidated by the Reduction of all *Canada*, from carrying on a cruel, and, for ſome time, ſucceſsful War againſt us. Thus we have been furniſhed with a ſtriking Proof of the Inſufficiency of this fantaſtical Hypotheſis, almoſt as ſoon as it was publiſhed.

There is another Sort of Security mentioned by this Writer of the *Intereſt*, the Security of never having another *American* War. A Security with which he may, without any Diſturbance from me, amuſe himſelf, and thoſe who chuſe to be diverted with this Kind of Speculations. But thoſe, who reaſon from Experience,

Experience, and consider from what Causes this last *American* War arose, will laugh at such an absurd Expectation. Whoever examines the Answer of * *England* to the *Ultimatum* of *France*, will see that the new Bounds of *Canada* will admit of as many Discussions, whenever the *French* shall chuse to enter into them, as our old Bounds in *Nova Scotia*, and on the *Ohio*, and that, independent of all these Difficulties, the real Limits of our Southern Colonies are yet further from an accurate Adjustment than those of our Northern.

There is nothing more painful than to be driven to maintain an Argument, where you have Reason to think your Antagonist is not quite serious. After all this Reasoning, does this Gentleman seriously, or does any Man whatever in good Earnest believe, that if the *French*, broken as they have been in this War, were in the Conclusion of it confined within the real Bounds of *Canada*, and that we possessed the whole vast Country of *Nova Scotia*, and all the Country of *Ohio*, that our Colonies could be in any real Danger from the Attempts of the *French?* Does he not on the contrary believe, or rather is he not fully convinced, that the true and real Danger would lie wholly upon the Side of the *French*; and that on breaking out of a War between the two Crowns,

* N° 28. *Fr.* Hist Mem. Art. 2. "*As to what respects* "*the Line drawn from* Rio per dido, *with regard to the* "*Limits of* Louisiana, *his Majesty is obliged to reject it.*" And again in the next Page, "*The Line proposed to fix the* "*Bounds of* Louisiana *cannot be admitted.*"

Crowns, they must be subject not only to some Degree of Molestation, but to utter Ruin from ours; that the Attack would be most probably from us, and that the *French* would in any such War gladly compound for a Neutrality?

But this being a Sort of Consideration not much pushed by the Writers, and addressed only to the Politicks of the most uninformed Vulgar, I shall not insist upon it.

In a Word, the Security derived from an irresistible Superiority, it is on all Hands admitted we might have had, without *Canada*, the Security against all Possibility of an Invasion, we have not with *Canada*, in its utmost Extent, and a Security on the extravagant Principles, on which *Canada* was claimed by all the Writers for it, which was in Effect nothing less than, that we should have no Neighbours, we neither could have with *Canada*, and *Louisiana*, nor with all *America*, nor indeed with any thing short of universal Empire. The Foundations upon which these Writers built their System, were laid in the most unbounded, and unbecoming Ambition. The Value of the Demands they made in Consequence of those extravagant Principles, was pitiful, and ridiculously low, and such as provided for no one national Advantage of the least Importance. Theirs was just the Reverse of an intelligent Policy, in which, the Pretences ought to be as moderate, and the Acquisitions as advantageous as possible.

I must repeat the Caution I used at the Beginning of this Part of my Discourse: I do

do not propoſe that *Canada* ſhould not be acquired, I only propoſe that the real Value of this Acquiſition ſhould be known. The *French* have made no Difficulty of ſurrendering all *Canada*. I am heartily glad (though I am no Way ſurpriſed) that they did not; becauſe it puts an End to a Diſpute, in which Paſſion on one Side would have been heavy enough to have over-ballanced any Weight of Reaſon on the other. *Canada* may be of ſome Advantage to us. I muſt confeſs I do not know what that Advantage is. But whatever it may be, I conceive we have paid the full Price for it, not only in Regard to the Value of the Objects exchanged, but alſo in Regard to the Situation of thoſe Objects, at the Time of the Exchange.

The Equivalent which *France* demanded for her Guarantee of *Canada* was a Participation in the two *North American* Fiſheries: that on the Banks of *Newfoundland*, and that in the Gulph of *St. Lawrence*. It muſt be obſerved, that theſe are two diſtinct Fiſheries: and that they are always conſidered as diſtinct in our Memorials *.

Either of thoſe Fiſheries, merely as an Object of Value, and wholly independent of its Situation at the opening this Treaty (when, as the Reader may obſerve, they were both in our Poſſeſſion) would I believe generally have paſſed as a very ſufficient Indemnification for *Canada*. But we admitted the Propoſal of *France* for both of theſe Fiſheries; annexing only the Condition of her

* N° 28. Art. 4. Hiſt. Mem. of the Neg.

her deſtroying the Harbour of *Dunkirk* conformably to the Treaties of *Utrecht* and *Aix la Chapelle*. Even with this Condition, I apprehend, the Bargain was ſtill infinitely in the Favour of *France*. Whether the Conceſſion was very mortifying to them as they aſſerted, I know not, nor do I think that their Feelings conſtitute any Part of our Intereſt. They certainly loſt very little by that Condition: and I think it is as certain that we have gained nothing by it.

Becauſe *firſt* *, they did not agree to deſtroy the trading Harbour, which was included in their Obligation under the ninth Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

Secondly, they refuſed to erect a Dam † againſt the Sea; a Work to which they had been obliged after the Peace abovementioned, and without which the Harbour cannot be deſtroyed.

Thirdly, they inſiſted that the ‡ Cunette ſhould be left ſtanding to preſerve the Health of the Inhabitants, which was exactly the Pretence upon which they before evaded the intire Demolition of that Harbour under the Treaty of *Utrecht* ‖.

The

* N° 27. Fr. Hiſt. Mem. Art. 4. "*His Majeſty will leave "the trading Harbour.*" And Vid. Occaſional Writer, Caſe of *Dunkirk* conſidered, p. 295, and 300.

† Pag. 59. of Fr. Hiſt. Mem. and Pag. 312, 319, 322, of the Occaſional Writer.

‡ No. 29. Art. 4. Fr. Hiſt. Mem. "*But the Cunette "ſhall be left ſtanding round the Place for the Salubrity of the "Air.*"

‖ Vid. 301, 2. Occaſional Writer.

The Harbour of *Dunkirk* would therefore have been only nominally deſtroyed. But whether it was to be deſtroyed nominally or really is, it is now apparent, a Matter of little Conſequence; but I think our again making a Point of it, after having in two Treaties experienced the Inefficacy of ſuch Stipulations, was not a Matter of Indifference; but in many Reſpects a moſt unfortunate Meaſure. This Part of the Treaty, inſtead of ſettling any thing, will only give riſe to daily and hourly Diſcuſſions; and it has opened an inexhauſtible Source of Contention, the inevitable Conſequence of which muſt be, either a ſhameful renouncing of a national Point, or the involving us in a new War for an inſignificant Object.

If we had conſulted our Reaſon, we muſt have known that no People will ever execute faithfully, the total Deſtruction of one of their own Places, when the Execution depends wholly upon themſelves, when the Place remains in their own Poſſeſſion, and when they have received their Conſideration, previous to the Performance on their Side; and if we had conſulted Experience, we ſhould have ſeen that this has been hitherto exactly the Caſe of *France* with Regard to *Dunkirk*, notwithſtanding the expreſs Stipulations in two Treaties, that of *Utrecht* and that of *Aix la Chapelle*. But what has rendered our admitting this Sort of Demolition among the Equivalents peculiarly unfortunate is, that when the

French have found that *Dunkirk* forms ſo leading a Part in our Syſtem of Politicks, they will (as it is always in their Power) by putting forward or by ſuſpending this Work, by pretended Demolitions, and by real Eſtabliſhments of their Harbour, continually play upon our Paſſions, and in the ſame Manner as they have now, they will for the future oblige us to purchaſe the ſame ineffectual Stipulation by the Ceſſion of ſome Object of real Importance.

After we have deducted the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, (the Value of which the Reader may judge) all the Remainder of the Equivalent, which the *French* paid for the two Fiſheries, conſiſted only in the Guarantee of *Canada*. This Equivalent, (contrary to the Baſis of the Treaty) came *not out of her uti poſſidetis but out of ours*, that is, in other Words, ſhe purchaſed our Poſſeſſions with our Money.

If *France* indeed had been in Poſſeſſion of all *Canada*, inſtead of being driven from every Part of it, and we Maſters only of the Fiſheries of *Newfoundland* and *St. Lawrence*; if in this Situation we had admitted her to a Participation of theſe Fiſheries in Exchange for *Canada*, I aſk whether any fair Arbitrator would not have conſidered it as a Bargain extremely advantageous to *France?*

But when we were indiſputably Maſters both of the one, and the other of theſe Objects; and by the fundamental Principle of the Treaty laid down by *France* herſelf, were obliged to yield none of *our* Poſſeſſions, for

which a Compenſation was not to be made from *hers*; if then we admitted her to take the Fiſheries which were in our Poſſeſſion, in Compenſation for *Canada*, which was alſo in our Poſſeſſion, would not (I won't ſay any Arbitrator, but would not) any Advocate for *France*, admit our Proceeding to be governed by a Spirit of Generoſity hitherto unexampled in the Dealings between Nation and Nation?

Having in this Manner ſettled the *North American* Account (upon her own Principles) wholly to her Advantage, would it have been inconſiſtent with the loftieſt Dignity on the Side of *France*, or the moſt diffident Humility on ours, would it have ſhocked any reaſonable, decent, or conciliatory Principle, if we were to have aſked in our Turn ſome Advantage, in ſome of the Equivalents, in ſome one Part or other of the World? Might not this Plan have been propoſed; that they ſhould take *Belleiſle* for *Minorca?* That we ſhould have given them, what they required, and it was not an unreaſonable Requeſt, *Senegal* or *Goree*, for their *German* Conqueſts; and when we permitted them to retain St. *Lucie*, which tho' comprehended in their *uti poſſidetis* was our Right, ought not they to have permitted us in our Turn to retain *Guadaloupe?* And if this did not ſeem to them a juſt Equivalent; if we had added to the Ceſſion of St. *Lucie*, the reſt of the neutral Iſlands (which to them might be of ſome Advantage) could the *French* Negotiator himſelf pretend to deny, that as in *North America* we had acted a very generous, ſo in the *Weſt-Indies* we acted

at leaſt a very moderate Part? Could he ſay that we had quitted the Baſis of the Negotiation, but when the quitting of it was clearly to the Advantage of *France?* Surely he could never ſay, with any Appearance of Truth, that we aſſumed a deſpotic Air, that we ſpoke in the Tone of Conquerors, or that we had made any harſh offenſive Uſe of our Victories; and yet this Syſtem, ſo reſpectable for its Moderation, would not have coſt us one Penny of Trade or of Revenue. It would have ſatisfied the Partizans both of *North American*, and *Weſt-Indian* Acquiſition, and the Day the Peace was concluded, it would have added to our *Engliſh* and *North American* Trade, a Source of Wealth cheaply valued at a Million a Year. Let the Reader compare the Effect of this Scheme with that ſtated in the ſixtieth Page of this Treatiſe.

I know not by what Fatality it is, but I ſcarce remember a Treaty which has been in any conſiderable Degree advantageous to this Nation, except that with *Spain* in 1670, by which our Right to *Jamaica* was confirmed. By that Treaty we poſſeſs at this Day a Trade worth within a Trifle of Eleven hundred thouſand Pounds a Year. The Peace of *Utrecht* was certainly a bad one, compared with the Advantages which we might reaſonably have expected. Yet even this Treaty was not wholly unlucrative to the Nation; for we acquired by that Treaty one half of the ſmall Iſland of *St. Chriſtopher*. The Sale of Lands in that half of

of the Iſland produced 90,000 l. which came to the Credit of the Nation, and appears upon the public Accounts; a Sum ten times greater than all the Poſſeſſions we ſhould have retained in the late Treaty would have paid us in a Century. To ſay nothing of the Trade of that Part of the Iſland, which is worth above 104,000 l. annually; whereas the Trade of all our intended Acquiſitions in 1761, if compared with the Charge of keeping them, is a good deal worſe than nothing.

I am far from thinking that no Sacrifices ought to be made to the general Peace of *Europe*. No Man, I believe, is inhuman or unpolitic enough to advance ſo cruel an Abſurdity; but becauſe we are to make ſome Sacrifice, are we carefully to ſelect for that Sacrifice the faireſt and fatteſt of all our Flock? the only Object we had acquired during the War, which we are poſitively able to ſay is of the leaſt commercial Benefit to us? And is *France*, to whom Peace is probably as neceſſary as it is to us, is *France* to make no Sacrifice on her Side, but of Objects which ſhe muſt confeſs, and which we know are no way beneficial to her? The Events of War are in themſelves of very little Conſequence. The Victors and the Vanquiſhed are nearly equal Loſers both in Men and Treaſure. The Terms of Peace are what diſcriminate the Fortune of contending Nations; and whoever may have won the Battles, thoſe only, have the Advantage of the War, whoſe Reſources after it, are the largeſt, and the moſt entire; and

and I defy any Man to ſhew one Inſtance in which that Plan of Peace, which we have examined, would have added one Penny to ours, or have detracted one Penny from the Reſources of *France*.

And here, I hope, it will not be thought aſſuming, that I take the Liberty humbly, but earneſtly, to recommend it to the ſerious Conſideration of our Superiors, whether at the End of a glorious indeed, but moſt expenſive War, which has laid ſo heavy a Burthen upon our Revenue, and our Credit, it ought not to be one Object, at leaſt, of our Attention, to find in our Conqueſts ſomething which might enable us to leſſen, or to bear the enormous Weight of our Debt. The very juſt Dread of increaſing which yet further, when we have added nothing to our Reſources, may one day be a Means of binding down our victorious Arms; and may even diſable, or at leaſt diſhearten us, from the Vindication of our juſteſt, and moſt important Rights. And I would ſubmit it, with all due Deference, to better Judgments, whether we ought not to deliberate a little, before we venture to throw out of our Hands an Acquiſition worth at this Moment above 600,000 l. a Year to our direct *Britiſh* Trade; and whether we ought to think ourſelves ſufficiently indemnified for the Expence of this very chargeable War, by ſpeculative Projects of Commerce, in Places which never enjoyed any Trade; and by Speculations for Security in Places, which were never in any Danger.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

THE foregoing Examination is confined to the State of Affairs during the Period of the firſt Negotiation. Of the Plan, which is purſued in the preſent, the Author profeſſes himſelf totally ignorant; but, whether his Reaſonings are invalidated or ſtrengthened by the Events, which have happened ſince the Period he treats of, he ſubmits without any new Argument to the Reader's Judgment, thinking that Matter tolerably evident.

A great Part of the Negotiation, which is the Subject of the foregoing Diſcourſe, turned upon Equivalents and Exchanges. It became therefore neceſſary to examine, with Attention, into the real Value of the ſeveral Objects, which, on that Occaſion, had been ballanced againſt each other; and he did not think this Examination had been made, at leaſt in any Piece he had the Fortune to ſee, ſo fully and ſo accurately, as the Subject ſeemed to require. In the Memorials, by which the late Negotiation was carried on, the Equivalents are ſometimes ſo confounded and huddled together, that it is not always eaſy to diſcern, what particular

particular Object is ſet againſt another; but the original Propoſals of the Duke *de Choiſeul* to our Miniſter at *Paris*, and the Recapitulation at the End of the Hiſtorical Memorial, enable us to decompound this mixed Maſs, and to ſee the Value, which was ſet upon each diſtinct Object.

The Author has had frequent Occaſion to mention ſome political Writers; but, in oppoſing their Sentiments, he has not ſhewn any perſonal Diſreſpect. He entertains the higheſt Opinion of their Parts, though he cannot forbear thinking, that, from a Miſconception of the true Merits of the Queſtion, they have for ſome time contributed extremely to miſlead the public Opinion; and he hopes the Reader will remark one Thing in his Favour. Diffident of his own, and warned by the ill Succeſs of much greater, Abilities, he has not ventured to entertain him with any political or commercial Speculations; for he will never allow thoſe Opinions to be called Speculations, which he ſupports by preſent exiſting Facts, by Cuſtom-houſe Entries, and other the moſt authentic Vouchers; theſe he gives in the Detail, and every Reader of common Senſe, and common Attention, is capable of forming a Judgment upon them; and he deſires to be heard no longer than while he ſpeaks from them. He hopes in return that the Public will

will not admit as Anſwers to his Facts any looſe unſupported Reaſonings, however ingenious they may be; nor permit the State of the Queſtion to be changed, or one Thing ſubſtituted for another. If ſuch Practices had never been admitted in the Diſcuſſion of this Queſtion, he is convinced the Public could never have been diverted from the ancient fundamental Maxims of *Britiſh* Policy; Maxims to which we owe all our preſent Proſperity, and the Attention to which at this great Criſis, muſt determine no contemptible Part of *Great Britain*'s future Fortune and Importance.

If, notwithſtanding the Corrections, which the Favour of the Public has given the Author an Opportunity of making, in a ſecond Edition, any Inaccuracies ſtill remain, it is hoped that ſuch a Misfortune will be conſidered as almoſt unavoidable, in the Management of an Argument upon ſo very comprehenſive a Subject in ſo narrow a Compaſs. This, however, he thinks he may ſtill aſſert, that no Miſtakes, which he may have fallen into, can in the leaſt tend to invalidate his Reaſonings: Quite otherwiſe; his Omiſſions are far more numerous than his Miſtakes; and theſe Omiſſions conſiſt in his not having puſhed to their full Extent the Advantages with which his Facts ſupplied him.

In ſtating the particular Value of *Guadaloupe*, he has been no leſs defective in

many Things, which might tend to ſet the Importance of that Acquiſition in its proper Light: For an Inſtance of this, he begs Leave to lay before the Reader a comparative View of the Trade of that Iſland, even in the imperfect State in which it ſtood immediately after its Reduction, and that of one of our moſt flouriſhing Colonies of *North America*, immediately before the breaking out of the preſent War. The Colony of *Penſilvania* is of ſuch Reputation, that he would deſervedly paſs for little better than a Madman, who ſhould deny or endeavour to diminiſh the Idea of its Importance. It is indeed a Country of very great Extent; one of the moſt opulent, populous, and growing of all our northern Eſtabliſhments; and cannot contain leſs than 200,000 Whites. This Colony in the Year 1752 took off the Value of 201,666*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.* in Merchandizes from *England*. This Demand is certainly ſufficient to eſtabliſh *Penſilvania* in our Opinions as a very great commercial Object; but compare this Demand of *Penſilvania*, after eighty Years Settlement, with that of *Guadaloupe* in its moſt imperfect State, in the Interim between its being a Conqueſt and a Colony; in this Point of Time the Demand for *Britiſh* Commodities in *Guadaloupe* amounted to 238,000 *l.*

Now if you compare the Demand for *Britiſh* Commodities with the Number of Inhabitants in each of theſe Countries, *Penſylvania* does

does not take off much above the Value of 20*s.* a Head; whereas the Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe*, ſuppoſing the Whites to be 10,000, take off above 23*l.* Sterling for each Perſon.

Upon this comparative View of their reſpective Demands from *Great Britain*; on what Principle can *Penſilvania* be conſidered as an Object of very great and ſerious Importance to our Power and Commerce, as in common Reaſon it muſt be, if *Guadaloupe* is not to be conſidered at leaſt on a Par with it; and in every commercial Light an Object of as much Importance. This is the State, upon the reſpective Demands of theſe two Countries from *Great Britain*, in which *Guadaloupe* is not inferior, but rather ſuperior to the great Colony of *Penſilvania*. But on a comparative View of their reſpective Exports hither, the Ballance is infinitely in Favour of *Guadaloupe*; the Export of the former to *Great Britain* is but 22,404*l.* 13*s.* 1*d.* that of the latter, as we have ſeen, amounts to 630,269*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.* above five and twenty Times the Value of that of *Penſilvania*.

In this View of Export to *Great Britain*, the Reader will take another comparative View. The Export of all the Colonies on the Continent which do not produce enumerated Commodities, and which are the only ones truly contraſted with the *Weſt-Indies*, amounts to only 70,074*l.* 12*s.* 3*d.* The Reader has juſt ſeen how little proportioned this is to that of *Guadaloupe* alone.

But to carry this ſtill further, the whole Produce of all the *North American* Colonies put together, amounts but to 648,683 *l.* 0*s.* 4*d.* which is but 18,413 *l.* 11 *s.* 4 *d.* more than the Returns of *Guadaloupe* alone.

FINIS.